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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The world is rapidly changing. Climate change, rising energy and food prices, the growth of agro-
fuels production, the emergence of new value chains and the increasing integration of traditional 
ones, increasing migratory and remittance flows, and urbanization are just some new issues and 
processes that we are facing.  
 
The way the world is changing has important effects on the livelihoods of poor rural people, and 
this will be increasingly the case in future years. In most cases, new issues and processes pose 
both threats and opportunities for poor rural people. We need a better understanding of these 
changes and how they make poor rural people more vulnerable, or how they can be harnessed to 
find new pathways out of poverty.  
 
New issues and processes require new approaches in rural development programmes and 
policies. For example, in recent years, a new architecture of development aid, value chains and 
public services has emerged and new actors and contexts have appeared in the field of 
development. This new environment is the context in which new approaches to rural poverty 
alleviation need to be developed, to ensure that development programmes and policies reflect 
emerging challenges and that they provide sustainable and flexible responses to them.  
 
The very nature of rurality is changing radically. There is increased inter-connection, interaction, 
and mutual inter-dependence of rural and urban settings. The ‘new rurality’ can thus best be 
summed up as previously held beliefs and assumptions on rurality being questioned.  
 
This paper focuses on four global and regional emerging processes and issues clusters or EPICs. 
These are, market EPICs – i.e. economics and markets; people EPICs – i.e. demography and 
employment; natural EPICs – i.e. the environment and natural resources, and techno EPICs – i.e. 
technology and technological innovation.  
 
We discuss the governance dimensions across the EPICs. We focus in particular on aid, value 
chains and the private sector and on public service delivery as three important policy arenas. 
 
In terms of the rural poor we identify enabling factors to strengthen adaptive capacity. We 
suggest four stages in a cycle of adaptation.  
First, there is the capacity of the rural poor to mobilise a collective response to the EPICs. This 
requires in-depth understanding of the nature of the issues and possible responses and a capacity 
to form collective response.  
Second, there is a stage of dialogue with other stakeholders notably the government. This is the 
planning of putting into practice the adaptation responses of the rural poor. It involves the rural 
poor dialoguing with other stakeholders on adaptation responses of the rural poor and in 
particular it involves dialogue with local and national governments on adaptation options in order 
to enable such adaptation.  
However, dialogue with other stakeholders such as local and national governments is not enough. 
There is a third stage of shaping or influencing the dialogue towards the interests  of the rural 
poor. This involves the ability of the rural poor to shape or influence the terms of their own 
adaptation. It is about implementing the adaptation choices of the rural poor.  
Fourth, there is achieving or actual adaptation and monitoring and evaluation of the achieved 
adaptation. This would then feed back into the first stage for new mobilisation. 
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SECTION I:  INTRODUCTION 
1a. Background 
Rural development has changed radically in the 30 years since IFAD’s birth. However, the 
current pace of change is accelerating and creating both challenges and opportunities. There are 
some major global and regional transformative processes and emerging issues. These are issues 
not just for the rural poor but also for everyone.  
Indeed, beyond the rural poor the issues matter to world citizenship because not only do the 
processes and issues have effects in rich and poor countries alike, in many ways there is increased 
interconnectedness and inter-dependence between the North and South. Major global and regional 
processes may destabilize existing livelihoods, unravel social fabrics, create conflict and 
exclusion and disrupt international markets. 
 
There have been various discussions of possible global futures. The most notable are the US 
National Intelligence Council’s 2020 Project and related Global Trends 2010, and 2015. There is 
also the EU European Development Co-operation to 2010 and 2020 projects.1 
 
A word of caution at the outset is due, noting Taleb’s (2007) Black Swans thesis regarding the 
unpredictable. As Phillips (2008) eloquently noted, thinking back to the 1980s who would have 
imagined the world now? Who would have imagined the spread of the Internet, the collapse of 
the Soviet block or the post-9/11 world? 
 
With this caveat in mind, this background paper for the IFAD Rural Poverty Report 2009 aims to 
identify what is currently changing, how it is changing and what it means for rural poor people. 
This paper focuses on four global and regional emerging processes and issues clusters or EPICs 
as they are evolving now. These EPICs are, 
 
? Market EPICs – i.e. economics and markets 
? People EPICs – i.e. demography and employment 
? Natural EPICs – i.e. the environment and natural resources 
? Techno EPICs – i.e. technology and technological innovation 
The concluding section then identifies governance and rural poor responses to these changes. The 
paper is structured in three sections. In section I we lay out the processes and issues that will be 
analyzed. Section II considers each of our emerging processes and issues clusters or EPICs. 
Section III concludes by identifying responses to the EPICs in terms of governance and the 
responses of the rural poor themselves.  
1b. Is there a ‘new’ rurality? 
Debates about a ‘new rurality’ have evolved in the last decade. The 'new rurality' is a term that 
has been applied to various ways in which the rural context is changing particularly so in, 
                                                  
1 See respectively www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_2020_project.html and www.edc2020.eu 
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? the relationship between rural and urban contexts (increased inter-connectedness via 
migration, technology, etc and the blurring of the urban-rural distinction); 
? increased diversity of livelihoods notably away from livelihoods based primarily on 
agriculture; 
? increased complexity and/or uncertainty as a result of rapid change; 
The FAO (2008: 4) note for example,  
For much of the last century, ‘rurality’ equated agricultural employment with 
rural population. The current reality, which has been defined as the ‘new 
rurality’, is one of a high level of non-agricultural employment and income in 
rural areas. In addition, there is no longer the correspondence that existed in the 
past between place of residence and place of work. Urban labour lives in rural 
areas and rural labour lives in urban areas.  
 
Haines and Robino (2006: 1) too argue,  
 
the ‘new rurality’ approach recognizes that in rural spaces diverse activities (e.g. 
agriculture, mineral, handicrafts, commerce and services) and diverse social actors 
(e.g., state, producer organizations, farmers, native population, rural and urban 
communities, NGOs, etc.) are involved. The structural changes recognized in the 
new rurality are indexed by the growth of non-farm activities as important source 
of rural income. The backbone of new rurality is the territorial character of rural 
development. 
 
In short, it is the very nature of the rural-ness of rurality (or non-urban-ness) which is changing 
radically to a ‘new rurality'. It is the increased inter-connection, interaction, and mutual inter-
dependence of rural and urban settings. The 'new rurality' can thus best be summed up as 
previously held beliefs and assumptions on rurality being questioned. For example, agriculture 
forming the primary income source, the blurring of urban-rural boundaries as people migrate to 
and from both, and peri-urban areas grow and changed relationships between urban and rural, and 
the feminization of agriculture. 
Rurality is traditionally defined by geography in the sense of a proximity to nature. It might also 
be defined by photosynthetic activity per hectare. There is a technological dimension in the sense 
of remoteness or limited 'connectedness' in physical and technological infrastructure, as well as 
demographic - low population density and economic - employment/livelihoods primarily based 
on agriculture, forestry or fishery or self-employed.  
'New rurality' suggests a definition of rural based a fluidity and complexity encompassing the 
similar domains of the traditional rurality. For example, 
? environment/geography – a proximity to nature and the continued importance of natural 
resources; 
However, very different in other domains. For example,  
? economics/markets -  an increase in the diverse of livelihoods – via  multiple livelihoods 
including or not livelihoods based on agriculture and natural resources, forestry or fishery 
and a proximity to nature); 
 8
? demography - an increase in mobility - a mobile population rather than low population 
density with lower mobility. 
? technology - an increase in connectedness - increased inter-connectedness meaning 
reduced remoteness in various senses of rural via physical and technological connections 
i.e. ICTs, mobiles, modern agriculture technology such as biotechnology); 
The net result of the above are new issues of governance - an increase in the intensity of rural-
urban relations – via the growing importance of rural areas to the state i.e. natural resource 
revenues). 
1c. What are the key global and regional emerging processes and issues? 
The starting point for IFAD is the rural poor as agents. Around this focal point we can map on the 
one hand, the RP’s access to and capacity to benefit from assets (i.e. the relevant RPR chapters) 
and on the other hand access to and capacity to benefit from governance structures and access to 
rural (public and private) services (as reflected in respective RPR chapters too). Finally around all 
of this can be wrapped a range of what we are calling the EPICs – or vulnerabilities and 
opportunities - which determine to a greater extent the relationships between the rural poor, 
governance structures and asset accumulation.  
 
EPICs are global and regional processes of economic, environmental, demographic or 
technological nature which include:  
? An EPICs driven by changes in markets i.e. market EPICs. For example, changes in 
agricultural commodity markets (e.g. growth of biofuels production, rising food prices, 
vertical integration and the growing role of supermarkets, new issues in agricultural trade, 
etc.) 
? EPICs driven by changes in demography i.e. people EPICs. For example, demographic 
issues (rising dependency rates, migration and remittance flows, displacement, new 
diseases, etc.), urbanization and the growing blurring of lines between rural and urban. 
? An EPICs driven by to changes in nature i.e. natural EPICs. For example, climate change 
and other environmental trends and issues and the changing link between energy scarcity, 
food markets, and demographic trends. 
? EPICs driven by changes in technology i.e. techno EPICs. For example, new 
technologies (e.g. synthetic fertilizers, agricultural mechanization, permanent irrigation, 
ICTs, biotechnology, etc.) meaning changes in the connectedness of rural areas. 
 
1d. Uncertainty, adaptive capacity and rural change 
Rapid change is tangible. However, the dynamics, impacts, consequences and arising 
opportunities and adaptive capacity of  rural poor people to respond are uncertain and determined 
by a myriad of factors not least their context, type of rural poor household and intra-household 
dynamics. As Leach et al., (2007: 1) sum up, 
today’s world is experiencing social, technological and environmental change 
at an unprecedented pace, across a variety of scales… processes are not only 
dynamic in themselves, but also interact in complex ways. The result is a 
variety of possible patterns - or pathways - of change... In many cases, 
different people and groups - in different settings, at different scales, with 
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different perspectives and priorities - will experience and value actual and 
possible pathways of change in very different ways. 
We thus need attention to the major changes themselves, to their inter-connectedness and 
interaction, to their scales and to their existence as a system where the whole is more than the sum 
of the parts and where agents – notably the rural poor – are adaptive, reactive to other agents and 
co-evolve over time. 
Until recently, understanding of rural areas has been driven by a static, linear and equilibrium 
analysis. Given the speed of changes these are now seen to be insufficient. A new emerging 
understanding of rural development is one of rural development as complex, dynamic, diverse, 
and uncertain (Chambers, 1997).  
What do we even mean by complex, dynamic, diverse, uncertainty systems? Scoones et al., 
(2007: 1) note, 
by dynamic systems we mean ones characterized by complexity, non-linearity and 
often non-equilibrium patterns exhibiting high levels of incertitude in system 
properties. ‘Dynamics’ refers to the patterns of complexity, interaction (and 
associated pathways) observed in the behaviour over time of social, technological 
and environmental systems.  
 
For example, Chambers cites Waldrop’s (1994) ‘edge of chaos’ (structure among uncertainty) 
theory as a possible explanation of why community groups in rural areas are able to exist in, and 
adapt to, a permanence of development pressures and social change. Warner (2001: 11) too notes 
rural organizations adaptive capacity to respond to changes 
 
in India, farmers have successfully made the transition from rain-fed to irrigated 
crops; in Nepal, forest ‘user groups’ have formed to exploit new community-
friendly forestry policies; and in East Africa, government wildlife departments and 
local communities have developed joint management arrangements for exploiting 
and sustaining safari hunting and tourism. By voluntarily venturing a small 
distance away from the order and familiarity of their traditional practices, these 
organizations have been able to restructure, learn new skills, develop synergistic 
partnerships and adapt to their changing environment.  
How can we seek to understand the system and the capacity of agents such as the rural poor to 
adapt? A body of ideas that has emerged in development research since Chambers citation of 
Waldrop on rural adaptation could be loosely called Complexity theory (see for discussion with 
regard to development, Ramalingam et al., 2008; Rihani, 2005; Warner, 2001 for example). This 
focuses on interrelationships rather than linear cause and attention to processes of change rather 
than snapshots (Senge, 1990). According to Ramalingam et al., (2008, ix, 1,4-5) this body of 
ideas aids, 
 
understanding of the mechanisms through which unpredictable, unknowable and 
emergent change happens… [and] can prove particularly useful in allowing us to 
embrace what were previously seen as ‘messy realities’. 
 
Ramalingam et al., (2008) list ten ideas around the composition of systems, adaptive change and 
agency (see box 1).  
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Box 1. Key Ideas in Adaptive Change from Complexity Sciences 
i. Systems are composed of, 
? Interconnected and interdependent elements and dimensions.  
? Feedback processes that promote and inhibit change within systems.  
? System characteristics and behaviours that emerge often unpredictably from the 
interaction of the parts, such that the whole is different to the sum of the parts.  
 
ii. Systems change occurs via, 
 
? Nonlinearity - i.e. when change happens, it is frequently disproportionate and 
unpredictable.  
? Sensitivity to initial conditions - i.e. small differences in the initial state of a system can 
lead to massive differences later; butterfly effects and bifurcations are two ways in which 
complex systems can change drastically over time.  
? Phase space or the ‘space of the possible’ - i.e. the dimensions of a system, and how they 
change over time.  
? Attractors, chaos and the ‘edge of chaos’ - i.e. the order underlying the seemingly random 
behaviours exhibited by complex systems.  
 
iii. Agency is a function of, 
 
? Adaptive agents - who react to the system and to each other.  
? Self-organization - a particular form of emergent property that can occur in systems of 
adaptive agents.  
? Co-evolution - which describes how within a system of adaptive agents the overall 
system and the agents within it evolve together, or co-evolve, over time.   
 
Source:  Extracted from text in Ramalingam et al., (2008). 
The point of departure is that systems are made of multiple elements and processes which are not 
only connected but inter-dependent. For example, rural livelihoods are not simply a result of 
adding up factors but of interactions and levels of uncertainty. Longer time frames necessitate 
greater levels of uncertainty. Indeed, the issue of time frames relative to rural poverty manifests 
itself in a number of ways. For example, the biological time frames of crops ad livestock to 
respond to major environmental changes. Thus changes related to the EPICs we discuss are often 
highly uncertain and separation of causes is not possible because the result is a product of the 
juxtaposition of factors (one could argue a demarcation of dependent and independent variable is 
thus problematic). 
What are the things one should we look out for in our EPICs discussion? We need to consider the 
interaction of EPICs themselves producing co-evolved outcomes. We need to consider the 
diversity of rural poor livelihoods and contexts. In our analysis of EPICs we need to be aware of 
feedback loops, non-linear processes, sensitivity to initial conditions, phase space, complex 
systems, adaptive agents, self-organization and co-evolution.  
 11
SECTION II:  MAPPING TRANSFORMATIVE EMERGING PROCESSES AND ISSUES 
CLUSTERS (EPICs) 
2a. Market EPICs – economics and markets 
Key processes in the economy that affect the rural poor can be grouped into three categories: 
globalisation and interactions with the world economy; national dynamics of economic growth 
and urbanisation; and, increasing scarcity of some resources. These will be reviewed in turn, first 
to describe the changes being seen and likely developments in the near future, and second to 
consider their implications for the rural poor.  
i. Globalisation and interactions with the world economy: International trade  
Progress on multilateral trade agreement under the Doha Development Round (DDR) is in the 
balance: while hope still exists that an agreement will be reached, it is far from clear that it will 
be. In the meantime, a profusion of bilateral agreements have recently been reached or are being 
negotiated at the moment, between major economies and economic blocks in the OECD and 
developing countries either individually or, more commonly, in groupings.  
For example, in the Americas there exist free trade agreements (FTA) between the USA and 
Mexico, Central America and the Dominican Republic, Chile and, in the near future, Peru. The 
USA also has the Caribbean Basin Initiative that gives trade privileges to countries within that 
region. The EU also has FTAs with the Caribbean, Chile, Mexico, and with Mercosur — the 
regional economic grouping and common market that includes Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and 
Uruguay. There are also bilateral agreements within Latin America, such as that between Chile 
and Costa Rica.  
For Africa, as well as the Caribbean and the Pacific, the EU is currently negotiating — some 
countries provisionally signed in December 2007 — a set of Economic Partnership Agreements 
(EPA) with regional blocks such as COMESA, SADC and ECOWAS. These deal with both trade 
and aid and replace the arrangements in place under the Cotonou agreement. There is also an 
FTA between the EU and South Africa.  
In Asia, the ASEAN grouping is working towards an FTA (AFTA). There are trade agreements 
between ASEAN and China, between Japan and individual countries such as Singapore and 
Thailand, as well as between developing nations such as Pakistan and Malaysia. Australia and 
New Zealand both have arrangements with Singapore and Thailand. 
For the Middle East and North Africa, there are deals between the EU, EFTA and the US with 
individual countries.  
Overlaying these trade negotiations are initiatives such the Everything but Arms (EBA) offer of 
access to the EU market for least-developed nations. The US AGOA offered similar privileges. 
The number of trade agreements is bewildering: the WTO list includes no less than 200, and this 
is not comprehensive since not all such deals have to notified, only those that concern deals 
between OECD and developing countries.2  
                                                  
2 There is also at least one radical alternative being developed in Latin America, the ALBA grouping of 
Bolivia, Cuba, Dominica, Nicaragua and Venezuela, that seeks to establish trade, finance and aid 
arrangements strictly outside of the WTO and the Bretton Woods Institutions.  
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There are plenty of cases in which developing countries have commitments to regional economic 
groupings — and in some cases, especially in Eastern  and  Southern Africa, they may belong to 
two or more of these;3 to the WTO; to regional trade agreements; and to bilateral trade deals. 
Analysis of these cases often reveals inconsistencies that have yet to be tested.  
In summary, in the absence of a DDR deal, there is profusion of smaller-scale negotiations. What 
these mean for the future in terms of allowing developing countries better access to markets both 
in the OECD countries and within the developing world is not clear. The recent flurry of activity 
in setting up FTA might suggest a commitment to freer trade; but equally, an equally strong 
motive for some deals is to maintain and protect access to an important Northern market that 
existed under previous arrangements, and that effectively excludes competitor countries.  
Generically, key issues arising under trade negotiations include the scope of trade and the 
standards that are applied. In recent times multilateral negotiations have been complicated by the 
extension of trade deals to cover not just the shipping of goods and commodities, but also 
exchange in services and recognition of intellectual property rights. Indeed, these issues have 
often become sticking points in negotiations. It is again not clear how much progress there will be 
in these areas. Food safety and sanitary and phytosanitary standards are another point of 
contention, where the tendency has been for OECD countries to raise the standards, at times to a 
point where the measures look like non-tariff barriers. The search is to establish transparent and 
fair procedures for setting such standards that will satisfy trading parties.  
How is the adaptive capacity of the rural poor strengthened or constrained with respect to their 
access to markets, livelihoods, natural resources, services and governance? 
For low income countries, the lack of a multilateral agreement can mean higher costs of 
negotiating regional and bilateral agreements, with more scope for important points to be lost to 
sight in the details of the negotiations. On issues such as intellectual property rights, specialist 
expertise is needed to understand the terms of agreements and their implications and low income 
countries may simply lack such expertise. Countries could be disadvantaged as much through 
ignorance as through design.  
The consequences for the rural poor of trade liberalisation — if that indeed will be the outcome of 
the negotiations in progress — are similarly unclear. Much depends on the interpretation of the 
consequences of greater trade liberalisation, or alternatively more trade protection, for the poor. 
For some observers, liberalisation of trade promises efficiency, investment, innovation, and 
consequently growth — with potential benefits and opportunities for the rural poor, largely in 
terms of jobs, that may well be in cities or in rural areas with export crops.  
For others, however, liberalisation threatens exploitation in unequal trade, blocking of national 
policy for industrialisation, an inflow of cheap food and the ruin of local farmers, with any 
investment from transnational corporations being that which seeks cheap local labour, tax 
reductions and less environmental regulation. The poor will thus either be left with no livelihoods 
or will be incorporated into global systems as the cheapest possible labour with no protection. 
Evidence exists for both cases, suggesting that much of what transpires depends on the 
circumstances in which trade liberalisation takes place. The challenge is thus to create the 
conditions domestically, and the international norms, that make positive outcomes of growth with 
benefits for the rural poor more likely than unequal and exploitative relations that leave the poor 
                                                  
3 The most notable overlap occurs where countries are members of both SADC and COMESA 
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worse off.  
What might those domestic conditions be? Two main implications can be discerned. One is fair 
access to markets for the rural poor so that they can benefit, either as producers or workers, from 
any economic growth stemming from trade liberalisation. That might mean, for example, 
ensuring that roads to rural areas are maintained so that produce can be shipped out and inputs 
supplied at reasonable cost. It may mean working to improve financial systems, so that rural 
producers can get the credit they need when investment opportunities beckon. It could require 
legislation to recognise traditional rights to property.  
The other is the protection of the rights of the poor, and in particular both their access to land 
including the commons; as well as to decent treatment as workers by the establishment of core 
labour standards and their implementation. Protecting those rights almost certainly implies that 
the poor be empowered through democracy and the freedom to associate to defend their interests 
and make their voices heard in policy debates.  
ii .Globalisation and interactions with the world economy: International capital flows 
Financial flows into developing countries are rising — see Figure 1. Since 1990 there has been a 
striking change in the balance between capital flows as aid, and those from remittances and 
foreign direct investment (FDI). While aid flows made up 44% of capital flows in 1990, they 
were just 14% in 2006, owing to the more rapid growth of remittances and FDI.  
Figure 1. Aid, remittances and foreign direct investment flows to developing countries, 1990 to 
2006, US$M current 
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Sources: Remittances from UNCTAD; Official Development Assistance from DAC members, 
DAC; and remittances from World Bank 
 
Flows of FDI and remittances, however, are unequal. Large fractions of each go to a relatively 
 14
few countries, and not necessarily those that most need capital. For example, while low income 
countries in 2006 received an estimated US$60 billion, US$179 billion went to middle-income 
countries. Sub-Saharan Africa received just US$11 billion. Of all the FDI to the developing world 
in 2006, US$379 billion, just US$36 billion went to Africa, and only US$12 billion to Sub-
Saharan Africa. Most of the FDI went to middle income and rapidly-growing emerging 
economies of Asia and Latin America.  
Aid flows are becoming more diverse with the entry of new donors including, amongst others, 
India, China, Venezuela and Brazil. Moreover, new global and challenge funds have been set up, 
both for sectors such as health, for example the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria 
(GFTAM),  and for general purposes, for example the Millennium Challenge Account. In fields 
such as health and agriculture, private funds from philanthropists have been established, such as 
the Bill  and  Melinda Gates Foundation. Non-governmental organisations (NGO) are also 
increasing their budgets, with estimates by the OECD DAC that NGOs in their member countries 
disbursed roughly US$15 billion in 2005 and 2006 (Koch et al. 2008).  
Future aid is likely to be influenced by two sets of considerations. One is the extent to which aid 
is focused on poverty reduction, seeking to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) 
with Poverty Reduction Strategies as the centrepiece of programming aid at national levels. The 
other is extent to which donors are prepared to harmonise their aid, following the principles of the 
Paris Declaration. While there are compelling reasons to move to an aid system that focuses on 
poverty and the MDGs with harmonised procedures; there are clear forces that militate against 
this. These include the priorities of new donors and funds that may not match of those of the 
longer-established donors. There are also differing appreciations of the most effective way to 
deliver aid: the main line of cleavage here being the degree to which donors are prepared to trust 
the governments of developing countries to use aid money granted as budget and sector support, 
or alternatively seek to distribute funds more directly to groups of poor and the activities in which 
they are engaged.  
The outlook is most probably that the trends recently seen will continue, with rising flows of 
capital from diversified sources.  
As aid, remittances, and FDI flows increase, there are clear challenges for governance, both at 
national and international levels. They include:  
• How to facilitate and encourage flows, reducing unnecessary obstacles and lowering 
transactions costs? This applies most clearly to remittances where transaction costs can 
sometimes exceed 10% of the value of the remittance; 
• How to encourage funds to be used in line with national strategies and priorities? Here 
the major challenges apply again to remittances, but also to FDI, as well as to aid and 
especially that coming from new donors and funds. 
• In the case of FDI, how to safeguard the rights of the poor and weak from rapacious 
investors looking to appropriate land and natural resources or to recruit labour at the 
lowest possible wage with minimal adherence to labour standards? And,  
• How to prevent greater flows of capital from being used by organised crime and groups 
dedicated to violence? 
How is the adaptive capacity of the rural poor strengthened or constrained with respect to their 
access to markets, livelihoods, natural resources, services and governance? 
Three things emerge, thus:  
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First, remittances potentially rapidly convey funds to households in rural areas. This presents 
challenges and opportunities to make the best use of them. It helps if there is a financial system at 
village level that allows recipients to save the funds, with interest, or to use monies to insure 
against risks, or to invest in a form of bond to pay children’s school fees and the like.  
There are greater benefits to the local economy and community if the funds are invested in new 
productive activities, or donated to community projects, or if they are spent on goods and services 
produced locally — as for example, when house improvements are made that create jobs for local 
builders. In some cases it may be possible to encourage these uses by, for example, offering 
matching grants from public funds for community initiatives or even for investments in 
production. Provision of business advice, or courses in the basics of business management, may 
be especially welcome and useful in communities where remittances are flowing and people are 
looking to start up enterprises.   
Second, when foreign investments enter a country, there is a challenge, already outlined above to 
encourage the kind of investments that create decent jobs, pay taxes honestly, conserve the 
environment, and in general demonstrate corporate social responsibility (CSR); and that avoid a 
‘race to the bottom’. It is up to government to take steps to protect the rights of the poor to their 
assets, to protect workers, and to encourage CSR. It helps as well if civil society organisations are 
vigilant against abuses. The poor, moreover, need to be free to form associations, such as unions, 
to defend their interests.  
In addition, not only does it help to make the most of foreign investment, but also it encourages 
such investments, if government uses its finances to spend on public goods — creating the 
physical infrastructure, the social investments in education and health, and the institutions that 
contribute to efficiency and equity. This is almost certainly a better use of public funds than the 
temptation to bribe foreign investors with overly generous tax breaks and grants that drain the 
public exchequer.  
Third, with increased and more diverse flows of aid, there is the challenge to try and direct this 
towards existing strategies and priorities. New donors need to recognise of existing knowledge 
and understanding of local conditions and draw on this, rather than treating the local context as 
clean sheet on which to implement their favoured ideas about development. Supporting and 
augmenting the capacity of agencies working in this field, rather than setting up rival 
organisations and duplicating efforts is another clear implication.  
It helps if the local context is one in which local government, civil society and local organisations 
are thriving and can give voice to the needs of the rural poor, and can effectively participate in 
setting priorities and plans, and monitoring progress and outcomes.  
iii. The private sector and value chains 
In many parts of the developing world, supply chains are evolving from their longstanding pattern 
of lengthy chains of traders and intermediaries dealing face to face, generally in spot markets, 
towards chains with fewer links, more contracting in advance, and more impersonal dealings. 
Supermarket chains have been prominent in creating new arrangements in agricultural supply 
chains.  
These potentially offer the farmer a better deal: higher prices; more certainty of being able to sell 
produce; and, in some cases the promise of credit and technical assistance. But that usually comes 
with more onerous obligations to produce to a higher and more consistent standard, to deliver set 
quantities in specific dates, and in some cases to provide certification of production practices and 
the origins of foods. In some cases these supply chains link farmers to the supermarkets selling in 
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the domestic market, initially to middle class consumers but increasingly across the range of 
consumers; in other cases the chains are international, with shipments to supermarket buyers or 
category managers in OECD countries.  
The process is uneven, by country and by commodity. In general, the new supply chains have 
advanced in middle income and emerging economies more than in low income countries, in Asia 
and Latin America more than in Africa, and for higher-value produce more than staples. The 
general consensus is that although the trend may be uneven, a trend it is, so that increasing 
numbers of farmers will be engaged, and more types produce are likely to be channelled through 
such chains. 
Two concerns have been voiced over this. One is that that small farmers will simply not be able 
to participate in the new chains, and will find themselves either unable to grow and sell certain 
higher-value crops, or will sell on residual markets where there will be no premia for quality and 
effectively produce will be discounted. The supermarkets and their buyers, anxious to reduce 
transactions costs, are always likely to prefer to deal with a small number of large-scale growers 
than to buy from a multitude of smaller farmers.  
The other concern is that the new chains confer monopoly power on the supermarkets and their 
agents, and that this will be used to drive down prices paid while setting ever-more exacting 
standards for producers.  
Other developments in supply chains for export crops include the increasing possibility of 
marketing organic produce and selling under fair trade regimes, both of which offer premium 
prices to growers.  
How is the adaptive capacity of the rural poor strengthened or constrained with respect to their 
access to markets, livelihoods, natural resources, services and governance? 
The new supply chains offer opportunities to the rural poor who are small farmers, but there are 
some stiff challenges as well. Organising small farmers is central to the response. If they are to 
interact with powerful new buyers, and have any hope of negotiating on an equal footing, while 
saving transaction costs, organisation will be critical.  
This is easier said than done. Nascent farmer groups probably need some support in their early 
days, in making links to buyers, in interacting with government, in learning business skills and in 
getting information on their options. But support needs to be provided without distorting or 
overwhelming such organisations. Previous attempts by governments to form farmers co-
operatives, a popular measure in the 1960s and 1970s, often failed. NGOs may be better able to 
work with farmers at their pace, but the existence of NGOs with appropriate expertise cannot be 
taken as given. 
It may well be that when small farmers do participate in the new supply chains, the main 
beneficiaries will be those small farmers with more than average resources: the non-poor. In such 
cases, there is an agenda of creating the conditions locally that ensure linkages from their success 
to jobs for their poorer neighbours. This is the familiar agenda of encouraging the rural non-farm 
economy: providing infrastructure, education and training, functioning financial systems, etc. that 
help spread and multiply the initial benefits to farmers to the rest of the community.  
This last point is doubly important when it is considered that it is unlikely that the majority of 
farmers will be able to take advantage of opportunities in the new chains. Not every farmer, for 
example, will have access to organic or fair trade niches: the markets back in the OECD countries 
for such goods are, for the time being, limited in size. It is hard to imagine in the immediate 
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future that all coffee, for example, on European supermarket shelves will be fairly traded or 
organic. Where the new chains involve high value produce, such as fruit, vegetables or flowers, 
again the markets are limited. Kenya, for example, has some excellent examples of linking small 
growers into international shipments of horticultural produce. But currently it is estimated that no 
more than 10,000 out of 1.3 million farmers have such contracts.  
For many farmers critical issues will be more run-of-mill questions about supply chain efficiency, 
whoever organises the chain and no matter what is traded, than about the opportunity to enter 
high value and niche markets. There can be some remarkable differences from country to country 
and from product to product in the share of the final price that farmers receive, owing to 
differences in supply chain efficiency.  
iv. National dynamics: economic growth and urbanisation 
Some parts of the developing world are seeing rapid economic growth of 7% a year or more, most 
notably in parts of Asia; while plenty of other countries have seen their growth rates rise in the 
early 2000s to reach 4%, 5% and 6% a year including parts of Africa.  
Growth is often accompanied by more rapid urbanisation, driven in large part by migration from 
rural to urban areas — see Figure 2. Much of urban growth takes place outside of the major cities, 
so that an increasingly dense weave of secondary cities and small towns emerges, reducing the 
distance between rural areas and urban centres.  
Growth and urbanisation are accompanied by changes in consumption patterns, including those 
for food, with increasing amounts of meat, fish, dairy, fruit, vegetables, and oils being eaten at the 
expense of less consumption of cereals, roots and tubers.  
Figure 2. Estimated rates of urbanisation 1995 to 2005, developing world 
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How is the adaptive capacity of the rural poor strengthened or constrained with respect to their 
access to markets, livelihoods, natural resources, services and governance? 
For farmers, the implications are increasing markets for higher value produce — and stagnating 
markets for staples, in urban centres that are ever closer to farms. If urbanisation is accompanied 
by corresponding investments in roads, then for many farmers the time and cost in reaching the 
market will fall.  
This presents opportunities to produce more of the higher value goods in demand. While the bulk 
of that produce may not come from the farms of the rural poor, linkage effects can be strong since 
some high value produce requires more labour than staples in production, processing and 
packing.  
But the effects of urbanisation are not restricted to opportunities for farmers. Those living 
relatively close to urban areas are likely to experience demand for recreation, environmental 
services (including water supplies), and for land for housing and decentralised factories. All of 
these create opportunities for new activities and jobs.  
Moreover, as urban centres become closer, for some villages there may be scope for commuting 
to the towns and cities for jobs, and longer term migration to urban areas becomes ever more 
feasible.  
In sum, interactions between urban and rural areas are likely to increase. For the rural poor to 
benefit, the usual conditions apply: that they have the capacity in education, skills and health to 
participate in new activities; and their rights to assets they have long used, including land, be 
protected.  
v. Increasing scarcity of resources 
Growth of populations and economies are always likely to increase pressure on natural resources 
of all kinds; a process modified by the ways in which changes in technology and preferences alter 
the resources demanded, and in which advances in exploration and extraction change the usable 
reserves of resources. One of the more surprising trends in the twentieth century was the way in 
which the real price of many natural resources fell despite the very large increases in population 
and economies seen. Predicting the limits to natural resources and associated future costs of 
resources is anything but straightforward.  
Nevertheless it appears that some resources are becoming increasingly scarce with rising costs 
either in markets or in terms of opportunity. The clearest examples lie with renewable natural 
resources — land, water, forests and woodlands, some key ecosystems, and indeed biodiversity in 
general. To add to this it may well be that oil and gas supplies may not be expanding at the rate 
that demand for them has been increasing. Certainly prices of crude oil have risen sharply and 
with few interruptions since 1999, see Figure 3.  
Figure 3. Food and oil price indices, 1980 to 2008 
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Medium term projections for the price of oil vary, with some at above US$60 a barrel4, a far 
higher price than has been seen over the previous 15 or more years. Indeed, at time of writing this 
paper oil is US$135 per barrel. 
Higher oil prices threaten to put a brake on economic growth that could deflate demand and hit 
the rural economy. Higher resource costs in general will tend to reduce the yield on public 
investments:  less can be done with the same budget. 
At the same time as oil prices rise, as Figure 3 shows, agricultural prices have been rising as well, 
driven upwards by the combined effects of harvest failures in Australia, Russia, Ukraine, 
increased use of maize to distil ethanol in the USA, higher costs of fertiliser and farm machinery 
diesel resulting from the oil price rise, and possibly from speculation on commodity markets — in 
a context of reduced stocks and buoyant demand for feed grains in the large, rapidly growing 
economies of China, India and other parts of Asia.  
A likely consequence of soaring food prices will be that both donors and developing countries 
will re-double their support to agriculture. At least, that is what world leaders, including the UN 
Secretary General, World Bank President and the UK Prime Minister, have been saying during 
                                                  
4 USDA projects oil prices in 2016/17 to be 13% higher than in 2006 in constant terms (USDA 2008, Table 
1). In 2006 crude oil prices to US refiners were US$59 a barrel (EIA data), so the projected price for 2017 
would be US$66.5 a barrel in 2006 prices. 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/intro/oil.htm, accessed on 21 May 2008, reports: 
The US Energy Information Administration Short-Term Energy Outlook released on 06 November 2007 
predicted that the price of oil imported into the United States would peak at $83.25 per barrel in November 
2007, and decline to $69 per barrel by the end of 2008. The Annual Energy Outlook 2007, released by the 
US Energy Information Administration in February 2007, predicted that crude oil prices would fall to less 
than $50 per barrel [in constant 2005 dollars] by 2013, before nearly $60 per barrel [in constant 2005 
dollars] by the year 2030. 
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the first half of 2008.5 The challenge will be to make good use of any additional funding, leading 
to fewer failed investments than previously. The danger with a rapid increase in funding for 
agriculture is that donors will plan ad hoc projects and programmes rapidly with too little 
reference to existing strategies such as PRSPs and Africa’s CAADP.  
Indeed, most commodity prices have been rising in real terms during the past two years: the IMF 
commodity prices based on 100 in 2005 was at 170 in February 2008. This has upset the trends of 
the 1980s and 1990s of falling real commodity prices to which decision-makers had become 
accustomed, that had led to a sense that resources were not scarce, that primary sectors of the 
economy were condemned to meagre returns, and that increased value was to be found in 
manufacturing and even more in services and above those producing the intangible benefits of the 
‘knowledge economy’.  
But with rising commodity prices there are new uncertainties. It is possible that the next few 
years will see a scramble for resources by large economies that lack reserves of natural resources 
within their own frontiers: those of the USA, EU, Japan, India, China, etc.6 That scramble is 
likely to be played out in many parts of the developing world and especially in Africa and Latin 
America where some countries have large areas with known or potential natural resources.  
The question here is whether the search for natural resources will be governed by respect for local 
sovereignty, the rights of the poor living in areas with valuable resources, and for environmental 
conservation: or will such values be swept aside in a competitive scramble, marked by 
international rivalries and tensions, with the potential to spill over into wars over access to 
resources?  
How is the adaptive capacity of the rural poor strengthened or constrained with respect to their 
access to markets, livelihoods, natural resources, services and governance? 
For the rural poor, rising transport costs from higher oil prices threaten to put them at greater 
disadvantage compared to urban residents. They are likely to face higher costs for inputs, 
consumer goods in the village, and lower effective returns at the farm gate for any marketed 
surplus, once deductions have been made for transport costs.  
Rising transport costs are also likely to exacerbate differences between remote and better-
connected rural areas, making some of the disadvantages faced by the former all the more acute. 
This would be a major threat to parts of Africa where low settlement density increases distance 
between villages and urban centres, and where transport costs are already higher per tonne-
kilometre than in Asia.  
For those rural poor who farm, the higher oil prices means that that will face much higher 
fertiliser costs, whose prices have in any case doubled if not tripled in the last two years. While 
this should stimulate technologies that economise on fertiliser, such as micro-dosing. But the 
concern is that many farmers may reduce their use of fertiliser. In parts of Africa in particular this 
will be exacerbated by capital market failings that mean that farmers have no working capital to 
buy inputs, so that farmers who could see a net benefit to use of fertiliser find themselves unable 
                                                  
5 There are echoes of the last major spike in food prices in 1973/74 that saw a World Food Conference 
convened in late 1974 and led to much-increased donor funding for agriculture in the 1970s.  
6 Brazil and Russia are examples of large economies within countries that have considerable reserves of 
natural resources.  
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to fund fertiliser. 
Rising food prices could hit those rural poor who are net buyers of food, and this probably 
includes most of the poor, hard with cuts to their real incomes and reducing their consumption of 
food. As more of rural incomes are spent on food, less will be spent on other goods and services 
and this could have knock-on effects for the rural economy as a whole, effectively acting as a 
multiplier in reverse.  
On the other hand, for farmers the higher prices should represent a major stimulus to produce 
more, offset of course by the higher costs of fertiliser and diesel to run machines. Response is 
unlikely to be immediate: history shows that farmers respond to prices with a lag; but it is 
nevertheless likely to be strong, and even for small farmers in Africa.  
Public investment in roads and other infrastructure and in agricultural research and extension can 
make the response both more certain and stronger. Similarly public action to facilitate the 
functioning of supply chains and to reduce market failures, in financial systems especially, will be 
valuable. 
It is unlikely that many of the farmers who are able to respond to the increased prices will be 
poor. But the poor can benefit from this so long as linkages from the prospering farmers to their 
poorer neighbours are fostered through, for example, actions to encourage the rural non-farm 
economy so that this can expand in response to the increased spending of farmers. 
If there is a scramble for resources in rural areas of developing countries, action will be needed to 
prevent the poor being marginalised as powerful interests appropriate local resources of oil, gas, 
minerals, forests, land and water. In agriculture, for example, there is the danger that policy-
makers anxious to boost agricultural production will turn to large-scale companies, perhaps 
transnationals, and provide them with land and in the process alienating the traditional rights of 
the poor, and possibly also diverting public investments to support such large-scale investments 
(e.g. roads, irrigation works). The siren-call of large-scale agriculture has repeatedly been heard 
in Africa: with few exceptions the results have been disappointing. Most commodity booms in 
Africa have been produced from small farms, not large.7 
When mining, oil and logging companies come looking for resources, can the rights of the rural 
poor be protected and respected? Will rents from resources be reinvested locally and equitably, or 
will they be siphoned off to the benefit of distant urban economies and small elites? 
                                                  
7 Large-scale agriculture has repeatedly been heard in Africa: with few exceptions the results have been 
disappointing. Examples include the groundnuts scheme, state farms in Ghana under Nkrumah, and the 
failure of Bud-Senegal. Most commodity booms in Africa have been produced from small farms, not large. 
Examples of commodity booms in Africa south of the Sahara include: Cocoa in Ghana from the 1890s to 
the late 1920s; Groundnuts in Senegal in the 1950s; Cotton in the guinea savanna of francophone West 
Africa, from the early 1980s onwards; Coffee in Kenya from 1954 to the late 1970s; Tea in Kenya, from 
late 1950s to 1980s; Maize production from communal areas of Zimbabwe, 1980 to 1987; Maize 
production from Eastern and Northern Provinces of Zambia, 1980s; Maize production from Southern 
Highlands of Tanzania, 1980s; Cocoa in Côte d'Ivoire, 1960s and 1970s 
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2b. People EPICs - demography and employment 8 
Why should we be so concerned about demography when dealing with rural poverty alleviation? 
At least three reasons could be put forward. Firstly, the current growth of the world population: it 
questions the ability of the world agriculture to feed the future world population. The current food 
crisis put this question back to the fore, and challenges the role of agriculture in developing 
countries both as a means to increase production and to alleviate poverty. Furthermore, this 
present crisis is not due to food shortage, but rather to the lack of income of a large share of the 
population that can not afford to buy food anymore. Secondly, the timing and the pace of 
demographic transition greatly differed between regions of the world: for each region, 
demographic transition took and will take place in very different economic environment which 
had and will have great influence on poverty. Thirdly, the evolution of age structures: the varying 
cohorts of incoming job seekers all along the demographic transition process could strongly 
enhance or impede the development dynamic of a country, and therefore change the opportunities 
to alleviate poverty. 
Taking into account these three issues raise concerns about the structural transformation of 
developing economies, more specifically the role agriculture could play in the development 
process and its capacity to fully contribute to rural poverty reduction. These issues can not be 
avoided, despite the fact that, the first one excepted, they tend to be out of the scope of 
policymakers. They directly challenge the capacity of economies to absorb cohorts of young 
people looking for jobs, and thus, the structural transformation pattern of emerging and 
developing countries. And this challenge is particularly important for ‘the majority of the poor 
will still live in rural area for the decades to come’ (Ravallion et al., 2007). 
These are the three dimensions that this section will deal with. For each one of those, the changes 
are exposed and their implications for the rural poor are discussed. 
i. Population growth and differentiated demographic transitions 
A classic demographic transition scheme starts with mortality decline, followed by fertility 
reduction. It first leads to an increase of population growth (when mortality declines and fertility 
remains high); secondly a decrease of population growth (mortality becomes higher than 
fertility); and thirdly an aging of population9. This demographic transition occurred at different 
periods of the world history and at very different paces10. 
The population growth rate summarizes the dynamic of the transition. As table 1 illustrates, 
population growth rate started to decrease in every region but at different periods between 1965 
and 1985. Much more impressive are the different evolutions of population growth rates over 
                                                  
8 This paper is based on an ongoing research program implemented by the World Bank and funded by the 
World Bank, France and Fad entitled ‘Structural implication of trade liberalisation on rural development 
(RuralStruc)’. For more information on this program:  
(http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/0,,contentMDK:21079721
~pagePK:146736~piPK:146830~theSitePK:258644,00.html.). The views expressed in this paper represent 
those of the authors, not necessarily of their institutions. 
9 Amongst other references, see Lee (2003) on demographic transitions over the last three centuries. 
10 In East Asia, demographic transition lasted between 50 and 70 years, the fastest to date. In Western 
Europe, nearly 150 years were needed. It even took 300 years in Sweden (Bloom and al., 2001). 
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time. Five regions behave rather similarly11: Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), Northern 
Africa (NA), South Central (SCA), South Eastern (SEA) and Western Asia (WA) recorded a 
decline of their growth rate at a quite similar pace. Then, at the one extreme, Eastern Asia (EA) 
population growth rate felt much more rapidly after the 1970-1975s’ peak and should even reach 
an expected negative growth rate in 2040; at the other, Sub-Saharan African (SSA) population 
growth rate is slowing down very smoothly, not leading to an expected fall below 2% before the 
period 2020-25.  
Table 1. Evolution of the population growth in the different regions, 1960-2050 (%). 
Period %
Eastern Asia 1,8 2,4 1,4 0,6 0,1 -0,4 1965-70 2,4
Latin America and the Caribbean 2,7 2,6 1,9 1,3 0,7 0,2 1960-65 2,8
Northern Africa 2,3 2,5 2,4 1,7 1,1 0,5 1980-85 2,8
South-Central Asia 1,9 2,3 2,3 1,6 0,9 0,4 1980-85 2,4
South-Eastern Asia 2,1 2,5 2,0 1,4 0,7 0,2 1970-75 2,4
Sub-Saharan Africa 2,2 2,6 2,9 2,5 1,8 1,3 1980-85 2,9
Western Asia 2,7 2,7 2,6 2,0 1,2 0,7 1980-85 2,9
1985-
1990
1950-
1955
Growth rate peak1965-
1970
2005-
2010
2025-
2030
2045-
2050
 
Source:  World Population Prospects, 2006 Revision. 
As a consequence, excepted EA where the population in 2050 should equal the one in 2010, the 
other Asian regions and LAC should still record increases, the most impressive being in NA 
(50%) and WA (60%). One must also keep in mind that the initial level of the population 
conditions the final outcome: while recording a ‘mere’ 43% increase, SCA will have to 
accommodate 759 million more people in 2050, the second highest increase after SSA, for a total 
population of more than 2.5 billion. Indeed, the most striking evolution remains SSA with a 
100% increase of the population by 2050: nearly 1.8 billion people in 2050, more than the double 
of the 2010 population (table 2). As Guengant (2007) reminds us, in 1500, sub-Saharan Africa 
had a population very close to the one of China. In 2050, SSA population could exceed the 
Chinese population, and hence, with one fifth of the world population, recover its erstwhile 
demographic importance. 
Table 2. Evolution of the population in the different regions, 1960-2050 (Million). 
Millions %
Eastern Asia 670 987 1 344 1 563 1 663 1 591 29 2
Latin America and the Caribbean 168 288 444 594 713 769 176 30
Northern Africa 53 86 144 206 268 310 104 50
South-Central Asia 511 777 1 243 1 777 2 246 2 536 759 43
South-Eastern Asia 178 287 441 594 711 767 172 29
Sub-Saharan Africa 180 293 519 867 1 308 1 761 894 103
Western Asia 51 88 154 232 312 372 140 60
2030 20501990
Population change 
2010-20401950 1970 2010
 
                                                  
11 Countries included in each of the region are given in annex. 
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Source:  World Population Prospects, 2006 Revision. 
How is the adaptive capacity of the rural poor strengthened or constrained with respect to their 
access to markets, livelihoods, natural resources, services and governance? 
 
The above data are now quite well-known and often quoted to question the ability of regions to 
feed their growing population, hence challenging their agricultural development. SSA has the 
double features of recording the highest demographic growth and the highest rate of rural 
poverty. 
This feature is stressed today because of the sharp increase of world food prices over the last two 
years. Concerns have been expressed on the consequences of this increase on the poor. Poor net 
food buyers who already dedicate a large share of their expenditure to food are the most affected. 
They struggle even more to access food, compromising their food security but also their sources 
of income: the efforts spend to find food can not be devoted to work. This price surge is not 
necessarily bad for everyone: net food sellers, even the poorest one, should benefit from it as long 
as they are well connected to markets (price transmissions) and that intermediaries do not capture 
most of the surpluses. Overcoming market and institutions failures is a fundamental prerequisite 
(Poulton et al., 2006). 
In the short run, what is at stake is the relative share of these two categories, net sellers and net 
buyers to determine the real impacts of the rise of food prices on the poor. Little is known on this 
distribution. Ivanovic and Martin (2008) attempted to capture these implications. They emphasize 
the diversity of the situations but recognize the general adverse effect of price increase on 
poverty, both in rural and urban area, hence offsetting the positive effects on net sellers. 
In the long run, as mentioned by the World Bank (2007: 8), jointly with the evolution of the 
world consumption patterns, the demographic growth is one of the factors that determines the 
world food demand. The World Bank estimates that cereal and meat production will have to 
increase respectively by 50% and 85% by 2030 to meet the world demand. Consequently, food 
prices will remain higher than in the past decades (OECD-FAO, 2008). What is at stake is the 
capacity to estimate whether this demand will be solvent or not, i.e. whether the economies will 
be able to create jobs and source of income to allow people to access food. 
The combination of these two challenges – the necessity to develop agricultural production levels 
and to reduce poverty – leads to the assumption of a possible virtuous chain reaction: the 
increasing food demand should enhance agricultural development, that should itself benefits the 
poor that are mostly rural, and hence alleviate rural poverty. Unfortunately, the situation is much 
more complex now than it was decades ago when such kinds of virtuous cycles took place. 
Income diversification has become a major characteristic of rural households all around the 
world12: Recapping several studies, Davis (2003) stresses that non-farm activities provide 
between 30 to 45% of rural households incomes and jobs. Because of these income 
diversification, the poverty reduction potential of agriculture varies greatly amongst countries and 
populations, depending on the share of total income agriculture represents for each household 
(Diao et al., 2007). Consequently, alleviating poverty is not only a question of agricultural 
development but also of non-farm activity opportunities: agriculture cannot be the only solution 
                                                  
12 The literature on income diversification is abundant. For instance, see among others Ellis (1998) and 
Reardon (1997) on Africa, Reardon et al. (2001) on Latin America, Wiggins and Davis (2003). 
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to rural poverty and multi-occupational diversity of rural livelihoods should become the 
cornerstone of a rural development policy (Ellis and Biggs, 2001).  
ii. Taking the age structure of the population into account – the capacity of agriculture to absorb 
labour supply and alternatives to agriculture 
While studying the economic growth pattern of EA and its demographic transition dynamic, 
Bloom and Williamson (1997) highlight that the tremendous drop of their infant mortality firstly 
impeded economic growth: economies had to bear the burden of their increasing young 
population that dramatically depleted the activity ratio (period 1), i.e. the number of active per 
one inactive13. Secondly, when the youth entered the labour market and hence boosted the activity 
ratio, countries were capable to create an enabling environment for economic growth and job 
creation – sound social, economic, and political institutions and policies (Bloom et al., 2001) – 
and therefore to benefit from what Bloom and Williamson (1997) call a ‘demographic dividend’ 
(period 2). They estimate that this huge increased of the labour force was responsible for one 
third of the economic growth between 1965 and 1990. And then finally, the ratio fell due to 
population aging (period 3). 
Our purpose is to determine how and when the age structure could enforce or hamper the 
development process – and not to assess the impact of the demographic dividend on the other 
countries. Therefore, the first period is critical since it corresponds to the time when the inactive 
population weighs tremendously on the development process. Six out of the seven regions 
recorded a reversal of the activity ratio prior 1975 (fig x). 
Figure 4. Activity ratio, 1950-2050. 
                                                  
13 Bloom and Williamson (1997) base their explanation on the dependency ratio, i.e. the number of inactive 
people supported by an active person. Since our purpose is to determine to what extend the active 
population could support inactive people, we rather use the ‘activity ration’, i.e. the opposite of the 
dependency ratio, and adapted their explanation accordingly. 
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Source:  World Population Prospects, 2006 Revision, and authors’ calculations. 
SSA is clearly the exception: not only the reversal occurred 15 years later, in 1990, but it has been 
followed by a very weak recovery. EA activity ratio grew from 1.3 to 2.0 between 1965 and 1990 
(25 years), while the region literally took off; SSA will only reach the EA level of 1965 in 2020 
and not even 2.0 in 2050. That is to say SSA will carry on bearing the burden of a huge inactive 
population for at least another decade – which corresponds to a real brake on economic growth – 
before hoping to potentially benefit from the demographic dividend14. 
EA is another exception since the dependency ratio increased very rapidly because of a strong 
and authoritarian demographic policy of birth control. It led to an amazing ratio of 2.5 active 
people per one inactive, a level none of the other regions will achieve. In return, the demographic 
dividend is shortened accordingly, challenging the ability of EA to sustain its growth in a lesser 
favorable demographic context, the ration being at its height in 2010. 
Consequently, taking the age structure into account allows us to identify key demographic 
features that will influence the capacity of regions to foster economic growth. In SSA, the age 
structure is a clear drawback that has hampered economic growth and will carry on doing so in 
the near future. EA will soon have to deal with an age structure much less supportive of the 
economic growth. In between, the age structure is much favorable to the other five regions since 
they will benefit from a high activity ratio over the next decades. Then, what is at stake is the 
capacity of the economies to actually reap the benefits of this structure, just like EA did. 
                                                  
14 This age structure also provides another clue to the difficulties SSA had to cope with during the 1980-90 
while engaged in structural adjustment reforms: a very week activity ratio, below 1, that hampered the 
increase of per capita income. 
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Whatever its position along the age structure evolution is, the capacity of every economy to 
provide jobs to its labour force is one of the main challenges. Fig x. presents estimated annual 
additional labour supply per region. The general shape of the evolutions for each region is 
necessarily closely related to the activity ratio. Several remarks have to be stressed:  
Figure 5. Additional labour force entering annually the labour market, 1955-2050. 
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Source:  World Population Prospects, 2006 Revision, and authors’ calculations. 
First of all, SCA is facing the greatest challenge with more then 23 million new comers, the 
highest level amongst the developing regions, before the situation smoothen progressively until 
falling sharply after 2035. Secondly, the SSA situation is very straightforward since the challenge 
seems to be ahead: economies have to absorb about 10 millions of new workers today and this 
figure will reach a peak of nearly 20 millions in 2025. For a median SSA country – 15 millions 
inhabitants – it means 250,000 people today and around 400,000 people per year in 20 years 
(Losch, 2006; Giordano and Losch, 2007a, and b). For these two regions, the dramatic increase of 
the labour supply directly questions the corresponding labour demand and its structural evolution 
from the economic development process point of view. Thirdly, in EA, the lowering of the 
population growth rate leads to a sharp decrease of the additional labour force after the peak of 20 
million people in 1995. From 2020 on, more people will exit the labour market than those 
entering it, a stark contrast with SSA. Finally, for the other four regions, the absolute figures 
appear less important, with peaks occurring around 2005 and a less stringent situation in the 
future. 
How is the adaptive capacity of the rural poor strengthened or constrained with respect to their 
access to markets, livelihoods, natural resources, services and governance? 
The employment structure of the SSA countries has not much evolved since the 1960s’ (Losch, 
2008b): contrary to what some recent studies state (World Bank, 2007), the agricultural 
economically active population (EAP) decreased by 25% while in Latin America, this drop 
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amounted to 60 to 70%. Consequently, SSA agriculture remains the first sector of employment, 
gathering 65% of the EAP on average. The median is actually higher, around 70%, meaning that 
a majority of countries in Africa has an agricultural EAP above 70%. Therefore, SSA countries 
still constitute the archetype of what the World Bank calls agricultural based countries (World 
Bank, 2007, p. 30). 
Such figures stress the key role played by agriculture as a major absorptive sector of the work 
force in SSA. Nevertheless, this agricultural absorptive capacity is not enough to cope with the 
cohorts of young people entering the labour markets. And contrary to what happened in other 
regions, the industrial sector did not take the lead as the classic economic transition would have 
suggested (Lewis, 1954): the level of employment in industry remains the lowest in the world and 
stagnated over the last decade around 9%; what better contributes to the absorption of the on-
going labour force has been the service sector and its share in employment has risen from 21 to 
27% between 1995 and 2007 (ILO, 2008). 
One must acknowledge that formal jobs are very scarce, and therefore, they take up wage 
employment or self-employment in the informal sector because people can not afford to remain 
unemployed (Bourguignon, 2005; Fields, 2007)15. The problem is that the informal sector, though 
having a high potential for job creation, offers unequal opportunities to take up the slack. As 
mentioned by Ranis (2008), it can be divided into two sub-sectors. The first one, a dynamic 
modernizing sub-sector, frequently subcontracts to the formal sector and appear to be very 
competitive and to offer income opportunities; the second one, traditional ‘sponge-like’ sub-
sector, emphasize self-financed, under-capitalized, small-scale, unskilled-labour intensive 
production leading to low revenue, bad work conditions and low productivity (DIAL, 2007; 
Pratap and Quintin, 2006). This is what Bourguignon (2005) calls ‘bad jobs’. What is then at 
stake is the relative size of these two sub-sectors. Since the modernizing sub-sector depends very 
much on the dynamic of the formal sector, and since the formal sector is very weak, then it is 
more likely for the ‘sponge-like’ sub-sector to largely dominate.  
The importance of this sponge-like sub-sector is related to one major characteristic of the strong 
urbanization process in Africa (and also in many parts of the developing world today): 
urbanization without industrialization (UN-Habitat, 2003, Davis, 2006). People tend to move 
directly from agriculture to services, but it does not necessarily mean an upgrade in terms of 
working conditions and personal welfare (ILO, 2006). This is a main difference with Europe and 
the USA, and with some regions of the developing world previously engaged in structural change 
(typically China, India) where industrialization fuelled internal migrations (Losch, 2008a). 
The predominance of ‘bad jobs’ in an economy is likely to lead to a larger share of working poor; 
the predominance of the sponge-like sector in SSA countries very likely explain the very difficult 
employment context they face: 85% of the employed people living with less than US$2 a day, 
and there does not seem to have been any improvement over the past decade. Such estimates 
clearly raise the question of whether the working poor are not trapped in ‘bad jobs’ with very 
heavy difficulties to get out of it. The situation is very similar in SA except that progresses have 
been achieved with the reduction of the share of the extreme poor in total employment. Only 
LAC and the Middle Eastern countries seem to manage to reduce the share of working poor. But 
as far as Africa s concerned, the major challenge lies behind. 
                                                  
15 Consequently, unemployment rates, as defined by labor economists, are rather low in SSA, at about 10% 
on average (ILO, 2007). 
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Table 3 Share of working poor in total employment, 1997-2007 (%). 
1997 2002 2007* 1997 2002 2007*
East Asia 18,8 16,4 8,7 59,1 49,7 35,6
South-East Asia and the Pacific 24,1 16,8 13,4 62,6 56,4 50,3
South Asia 53,3 42,4 33,0 91,5 86,8 80,3
Latin America and the Caribbean 11,6 10,9 8,0 33,6 32,6 25,4
Middle East 2,4 2,8 4,2 24,3 22,6 19,3
North Africa 2,6 2,0 1,6 50,1 48,7 42,0
Sub-Saharan Africa 57,4 55,6 53,0 86,8 86,7 85,4
US$1 a day working poor US$2 a day working poor
 
Source:  ILO (2008), *2007 are preliminary estimates. 
This sponge-like sector is probably one of the reasons why, while urbanization should lead to a 
decrease of the global poverty, it does not seems to be the case in Africa (Ravallion et al., 2007). 
It clearly points out the difficulty of finding alternatives and the core issue of employment 
creation both in rural and urban areas. As Ellis (2006) pointed out, reducing poverty in SSA has 
to rely on a prosperous agricultural sector; but such an outcome is only possible if accelerate 
urban economic growth provides decent jobs to the on-going workforce so as to create a strong 
domestic market for agricultural and rural outputs: urbanization has to be a major component of 
rural poverty reduction strategy, and urban and rural poverty alleviation strategies have to support 
each others (UNFPA, 2007: 35-37). Such an evolution is crucial for Africa to seize the 
opportunities the demographic dividend will offer. This has to be emphasized especially at this 
time of great focus on the need to develop agriculture to respond to the high price crisis.  
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2c. Natural EPICs - environment and natural resources 
A long list of environmental concerns affect the rural poor, as might be imagined for people the 
majority of whom depend directly on natural resources for their livelihoods — working on farms, 
in forests, or fisheries. Three have been picked out as particularly important — climate change, 
water scarcity, and soil loss and degradation — but that does not mean that in particular 
circumstances other environmental issues may not be equally or more pressing for some groups 
of rural poor. In the final section of this chapter, other concerns thus will be addressed in brief. 
i. Climate change 
Climate change owing to human activities is already underway, although most of the expected 
effects lie in the future. At the heart of climate change is global warming arising from emissions 
of greenhouse gases that will then affect rainfall and cause rises in sea levels, with major 
consequences for natural life on the planet.  
Table 4. Expected effects of climate change 
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Source:   IPCC (2007). 
 
As Table 4 shows, one way to classify the expected effects is by changes in means versus 
increased variation in climate. The latter may be more threatening than the former, if only 
because the historical record suggests that people can adapt to relatively slow changes in their 
environment, but can be overwhelmed by sudden changes (Goldman 1995). 
Of the changes predicted, those with the most widespread effects arise with rainfall. Patterns will 
alter, with different areas becoming wetter or drier. Although it is still difficult to estimate these 
effects with precision, Figure x shows one set of forecasts of changes in rainfall.  
Figure 6. Predicted changes in global rainfall patterns 
 
Source:   IPCC (2007). 
 
Some relatively well-populated areas already with semi-arid climates are likely to become drier, 
such as Southern Europe and the Mediterranean basin, Southern Africa, North-East Brazil, 
northern Mexico and southern Australia. Water scarcity in such cases — see below — will be 
exacerbated.  
Variability will also increase, with more rainfall falling in intense downpours and extreme events 
such as storms and cyclone, with potential for flooding and other damage. The seasonality of 
rainfall may become more pronounced, with greater potential for flooding in the wet season and 
for droughts in the dry. Agriculture is likely to suffer from increased variations in rainfall and 
harvest failures as periods of drought or to flooding and water logging probably become more 
frequent. If the current spike in the prices of food and other agricultural commodities is in large 
part caused by fluctuations in harvests, then such spikes could become more frequent than in the 
past. 
Rising temperatures in some areas may allow more crop production and longer growing seasons, 
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above all in high latitudes where cold winters limit agriculture. Increased concentrations of 
carbon dioxide may encourage the growth of some crops — the ‘fertiliser’ effect. But against this, 
higher temperatures in other areas mean higher evapotranspiration and less effective rainfall, 
while temperature rises in the tropics will start to limit plant production. 
Rising sea levels threaten coastal areas with higher tides, storm surges, flooding of low-lying 
coastal areas, salination of coastal freshwater, and loss of ecosystems such as mangrove swamps. 
Some low-lying coastal areas, most notably river deltas, may become uninhabitable.  
Melting of glaciers will affect the lives of the one-sixth of the world’s population that live in 
catchments fed by meltwaters. Initial effects may be for more flooding, but as the glaciers retreat 
there is likely to be less storage within the river basins with more variation in river flows, less 
aquifer recharge, and seasons within the year of increasing water scarcity.  
Changed climates are in turn likely to affect ecosystems, with changes in the range and 
distribution of flora and fauna. In some cases this may mean that insects as disease vectors spread 
to previously unaffected areas, as may occur with an advance of malaria into higher latitudes. 
Relatively rapid change in climate may mean some species cannot respond to their changed 
environment and will become extinct. 
How is the adaptive capacity of the rural poor strengthened or constrained with respect to their 
access to markets, livelihoods, natural resources, services and governance? 
 
Three effects will be particularly important for the rural poor:  
First, increased variations in agricultural production in response to more variable weather. As 
farmers, farm labourers or workers in agricultural supply chains, the rural poor are likely to see 
more variation in days worked, wage rates, and incomes earned. Seasonal patterns in earnings and 
consumption, and especially the existence of hungry seasons, are likely to become more 
pronounced.  
Second, more frequent disasters. Storms and tidal surges will probably harm the poor more than 
others, since the poor often live in places with least protection and resilience to extreme weather 
— such as low-lying areas or unstable slopes liable to collapse when soaked by storms. For lack 
of better constructed housing, they are likely to lose their homes to extreme weather; as well as 
their tools, household possessions, and livestock. In the aftermath of disastrous storms they may 
further lose access to clean water and live in unsanitary conditions, thereby creating conditions of 
high risk for water-borne diseases and those transmitted by vectors such as insects. Their children 
will be at particularly high risk.  
More frequent and intense droughts will be another hazard, again straining the coping 
mechanisms of the rural poor. 
In areas especially prone to the increased risks — such as low-lying coastal areas of which the 
great deltas of Asia are prime examples — there may be mass migrations to less susceptible 
locations further inland and on higher ground. 
Third, more people living on ever poorer resources or mass migration.  
As climate belts shift, the correspondence between rural population density and the quality of 
natural resources will alter. Areas of relatively heavy density of settlement on what become lands 
of limited potential will increase, with the probability that incomes from farming, forestry and 
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fishing will decline and become more variable. Examples of rural areas that are heavily populated 
in relation to the resource already exist — the Upper East Region of Ghana is a case in point — 
but it is likely that many more areas will come to share similar characteristics. Unless non-farm 
activities can be developed to compensate for the loss of natural potential, then these areas are 
likely to see out-migration and otherwise become pockets of deep poverty and vulnerability. 
The alternative is that, faced by radical changes in the potential of their lands, farmers will 
undertake mass migrations to areas that were previously of low potential, lightly populated but 
which now have better potential. In the last two centuries there have been many examples of such 
movements of people looking to take advantage of lands that have either become accessible or 
which have become more attractive for farming. It is likely that such movements will become 
more common and larger in the future. 
Migration from one rural area to another can potentially lead to conflicts over land access with 
existing residents, especially where the latter have been using the resources extensively and claim 
rights over large areas. The problem, however, should not be exaggerated: in lightly populated 
lands with good agricultural potential, shortage of labour is likely to be more important than land, 
so that residents may welcome newcomers who are ready to help work the land. West Africa has 
various examples of such movements and accommodations between longstanding residents and 
‘strangers’ in the last century. Of course, it helps when movements are relatively slow and 
gradual, and there is time for small groups of migrants to form amicable relations with residents: 
when the scale of migration is large and sudden, the potential for conflict rises.  
Migration out of areas with declining resources may also be to urban areas, throwing up the 
spectre of large encampments of environmental refugees living in squalor on the margins of urban 
life. If, however, the pace of urban economic development is rapid, towns and cities may be able 
to absorb the migrants and they may find decent jobs. History does not seem to offer too many 
examples of urban growth rapid enough to do this, although parts of coastal China over the last 
quarter century provide one model.  
It is easy to see that the rural poor will be particularly vulnerable to effects of climate change; 
since they often rely heavily on natural resources for the core of their livelihoods, live in areas 
susceptible to hazards, and for reasons of poverty have limited resilience to shocks. On the other 
hand, it would be wrong to see the rural poor as passive victims of circumstances. On the contrary 
detailed studies reveal plenty of cases of active reaction to change. Box 2 records cases of African 
farmers responding to climate change. 
Box 2: Reacting to climate change in rural Africa 
Climate change is fact of life for many rural people in Africa, whether those changes be part of 
fairly regular cycles or the effects of global warming.  
For example, in the Sahel, the relatively wet 1950s were followed by drier periods — including 
the disastrous 1968–1974 droughts, that in turn was followed by wetter years in the 1990s. Cycles 
in some parts of West Africa are combined with trends towards lower rainfall seen over decades. 
Rural people are acutely aware of such changes and react accordingly. Here are three examples:  
• In south-east Benin, in response to later rains, farmers have planted shorter-season 
varieties on the now dried-out swamp forest lands; 
• In Njoro Division, Kenya, more variable rainfall has seen farmers switch from wheat and 
potatoes to the faster-growing maize and beans, take up rain water harvesting and form 
savings clubs; and, 
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• In Mulanje, Malawi, faced by less rain and rising temperatures that have blurred seasonal 
differences, farmers have also adopted short-season varieties —  
‘Farmers are now planting a minimum of two crops in their gardens, mixing 
cereals with pulses and tubers, often intercropping with nitrogen-fixing pigeon 
peas. Diverse crops and relay-cropping through the rainy season are effective 
means of ensuring at least some harvest. Community organisations have also 
developed partnerships with the local tea industry and development NGOs to 
manage wetlands, construct small-scale irrigation and experiment with wood-
efficient stoves.’  
Source:  Vermeulen et al., (2008) 
 
Three things can offset the bad effects of climate change on the rural poor. One is overall growth 
and development: the more people can be lifted out of poverty and the more successful the 
economy, the more scope there will be for people to adapt to change. Successful development 
enhances capabilities at all levels from individual education and health to collective ability to 
organise and respond to change.  
Information is part of this: better developed societies may be more able to make use of 
forecasting, modelling, and scenario planning to prepare more effectively for hazards.  
Another is diversification: the less the dependence on any one activity and especially those 
concerned with natural resources, the easier it will be to cope with the increased weather hazards 
being predicted. Economic growth in itself is likely to stimulate more diversified activity, an 
effect that is likely to be greater the broader the pattern of growth is both in coverage of sectors 
and engagement of different social groups and regions.16  
A third is developing improved means of coping through appropriate forms of insurance, social 
protection, and more awareness and preparedness for disasters. This is a large agenda, with issues 
at scales from the individual and household to national government and to international forums.  
One issue here will be striking a balance between the duty of individuals to be prepared for 
shocks, and that of the state to protect its citizens. For example, in areas where climate change has 
led to a failing local agriculture, should the state provide social protection for those living in such 
areas — with the possibility that the safety nets become a continuing provision marked by 
increasing dependency on the part of recipients and patronage by the state bureaucracy? Or 
should the state expect citizens to adapt, if necessary by wholesale out-migration? Do people 
have the right to remain in their areas of origin and still make claims on the state, no matter what 
the circumstances?  
These three challenges set a rich agenda for policy and initiatives at all levels, from international 
down to village level, both public and private. At the heart of the debate on how to react to the 
challenge of climate change lies a key question: is it possible to prepare with some certainty for 
the changes afoot — as seen in the trend towards trying to make development plans ‘climate 
proof’; or given uncertainties, is the better option to develop the capacity to adapt, that is to 
increase the resilience of systems? Some combination of the two will almost certainly be needed.  
                                                  
16 Narrow growth, as might occur with mining enclaves, could increase specialisation in the economy and 
increase vulnerability. 
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A danger here is that while ‘climate proofing’ of development plans does not require significant 
changes in policy-making, development planning and implementation; improving adaptive 
capacity probably does. To explain, trying to prepare for specific features of climate change 
allows a familiar process of setting fairly concrete goals, then finding effective and efficient ways 
to reach them. Increasing adaptive capacity requires wider changes across human systems — 
embracing education, governance, and information — that are less easy to programme. The 
general problem is they require systems to be less tightly coupled, measures that seen through 
paradigms of efficiency appear to be wasteful.17 Since improved adaptive capacity will almost 
certainly change the balance of power, some politicians will see this as threatening.  
ii. Water scarcity and pollution 
 
Already large numbers of people live in areas where water is scarce, including northern Mexico, 
southern Africa, North China, the North-West of the Indian sub-continent, and the Mediterranean 
basin, see Figure 7. 
Figure 7. Areas of water scarcity 
 
Source:  UNESCO 2006 
 
Water scarcity will get worse in the future under two pressures. One, economic growth and 
population will increase the demand for water, increasing the likelihood of additional areas facing 
acute scarcity of water. Two, climate change as described above will change rainfall patterns, 
make them more erratic, and reduce storage in glaciers. While overall water supplies may not fall, 
                                                  
17 See Hood (1991) on three sets of values in public management: lean and purposeful; honest and fair; and, 
robust and resilient. 
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uneven distribution through space and time will make for more scarcity. 
Some forms of water pollution could get worse. For example, run-off from intensively farmed 
fields contaminated by agro-chemicals, industrial effluents and sewage from urban areas, and silt 
from soil erosion are all hazards that may increase from economic growth. More variable rainfall 
regimes may mean that at times of low flow the concentration of contaminants may rise.  
Salination is a threat that may increase from sea levels rising for coastal areas, and in aquifers as 
groundwater reserves are drawn down.  
Not all these processes are inevitable or unmanageable, but they do set challenges. Water scarcity 
can be mitigated by collecting more of the rainfall, as seen in rainwater harvesting. More efficient 
use of water supplies — through, for example, drip irrigation, mending leaks in distribution 
systems, and recycling water from one use to another —is another response. Finding institutions 
and forms of governance to allocate water in line with social priorities is another: currently most 
of the water used by society goes for agricultural irrigation. At the margin and in densely settled 
areas, some of this probably has a higher value as drinking water.  
Most forms of pollution can be reduced through better use of farm inputs and management of 
wastes. Once again, the challenge is a combination of technical advances to facilitate this, 
combined with incentives and institutions that encourage reduction of pollution.  
How is the adaptive capacity of the rural poor strengthened or constrained with respect to their 
access to markets, livelihoods, natural resources, services and governance? 
 
The rural poor already pay a heavy price for water and its quality. In semi-arid areas it is not 
unusual for domestic water to be collected from water points that can be several kilometres from 
dwellings, and head-loaded home. The time taken by this can be measured in several hours a day, 
and usually the responsibility falls on females.  
For health both quality and quantity of water are issues. Contaminated water increases the 
likelihood of enteric disease and parasites, with young children most at risk. Lack of water means 
that washing is likely to be minimal with consequent potential for the spread of enteric diseases.  
Exacerbation of these problems through declining water supplies or their increasing 
contamination is thus a matter of concern.  
In more humid areas, the rural poor may be affected by water scarcity in irrigation systems. Poor 
farmers living on the margins or tail ends of irrigation systems may find they get less allocation 
than the others. When groundwater supplies are first tapped, the first wells are usually sunk by 
better-off farmers: by the time the poor can invest in a well, the aquifers are sometimes drawn 
down and their wells have to be deeper and pumping costs are higher.  
There are ways to combat these problems. One is through making the best use of new technology 
make efficient use of water, keep it cleaner, and recycle water. Small public investments can 
improve the efficiency of domestic water pumps and save time at wells. The benefits of these 
accrue particularly to poor women.  
The other is through developing the institutions that encourage a fair and efficient use of scarce 
collective resources. At the local level this can mean devolving management and allocations 
decisions to local committees —provided that the committees include the poor. At higher levels, 
better management at the level of river basins and water catchments can also make a difference.  
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iii. Soil erosion and degradation  
 
Reports of declining soil fertility and erosion in the developing world are widespread. For 
example, the World Bank (2007) World Development Report on Agriculture reports ‘Some 
sources suggest that globally, 5 to 10 million hectares of agricultural land are being lost annually 
to severe degradation’.  
A recent overall assessment, looking at changes in net primary productivity (NPP) compared to 
rain-use efficiency as a measure of degradation between 1981 and 2003, reported that:  
there was an absolute decline in NPP across 12 cent of the global land area, with a strong 
negative change in a further 1 per cent of the land area. In respect of rain-use efficiency, 
there was an absolute decrease on 29 per cent of the land area and strong negative change 
on 2 per cent.  
The areas affected are home to about 1 billion people, some 15 per cent of the global population.  
 
Apart from the loss of farm and forest production, the degraded areas represent a loss of NPP of 
about 800 million tonnes of carbon over the period, meaning this amount was not fixed from the 
atmosphere. In addition, there were emissions to the atmosphere of one or two orders of 
magnitude more than this from the loss of soil organic carbon and standing biomass. 
 
Areas of concern include tropical Africa south of the equator and southeast Africa, southeast Asia 
(especially steeplands), south China, north-central Australia, Central America and the Caribbean 
(especially steeplands and drylands), southeast Brazil and the Pampas, and boreal forests in 
Alaska, Canada and eastern Siberia. In areas of historical land degradation around the 
Mediterranean and West Asia, only relatively small areas of change are visible, such as in 
southern Spain, the Maghreb and the Iraqi marshlands.  
 
Comparison of black spots with land cover reveals that 18 per cent of land degradation by area is 
associated with cropland, 25 per cent is in broad-leaved forests and 17 per cent in boreal forests. 
This is consistent with trends in forest degradation, even as the area of boreal forests has 
increased (see section on Drivers and pressures). This preliminary analysis will need to be 
validated on the ground by the country-level case studies being undertaken by LADA, which will 
also determine the different types of degradation (UNEP, 2007) The geography of degradation is 
shown in Figure 8. 
Figure 8. Land degradation, 1981–2003 
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Source:  UNEP (2007). 
The evidence, however, is incomplete and sometimes contested, as are the causes of soil loss and 
degradation. In some accounts, over-use of soils and their loss are the result of ever-greater 
population pressure on the land, the land being over-worked as more people try to subsist off 
ever-smaller farms. Others point out that as population increases, land use may initially over-tax 
the soil especially when fallows are shortened, but that with further increases in population, 
farmers are likely to invest in soil fertility through manuring and fertilisation, and to conserve 
their fields. This last argument needs some qualification: farmers will only invest in their soils if 
the value of conservation outweighs the costs. When, for example, the value of agricultural 
production is low, then soils of indifferent quality may just be worked until they have reached 
what amounts to an equilibrium of low nutrients, after which low-input, low-output farming 
ensues — a situation reported in parts of the Indian Deccan and Northern Nigeria.  
There are examples that illustrate both good and bad outcomes. Rather than proving any general 
case, they tend to show that outcomes depend on a combination of factors — including 
population pressure; the nature of soils and topography; relative prices of land, labour, farm 
produce, agricultural inputs and credit, knowledge of conservation measures, the possibility of 
employment off the farm, etc., — making for very different outcomes in different places and at 
different times.   
Since the causes of degradation are both various and contested, the extent to which soil will be 
either conserved or over-used in the future is uncertain; even if the drivers of increasing 
population and greater demand for agricultural land and for agricultural produce are certain. Most 
likely there will be different pathways in conservation or degradation depending on the many 
factors that influence such outcomes. The challenge will be to find ways to support forces for 
conservation and offset those that push towards degradation. The one thing that is clear is that in a 
more populous world with a fixed land base, the costs of degradation will increase.  
How is the adaptive capacity of the rural poor strengthened or constrained with respect to their 
access to markets, livelihoods, natural resources, services and governance? 
 
Since the rural poor often depend either directly or indirectly on agriculture and other natural 
resource-based activities for their livelihoods land degradation is a significant threat. Some are 
more at risk than others, including those living in areas of low fertility soils, sloping land, where 
rainfall tends to be concentrated in intense downpours or where strong winds prevail, and where 
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the farming system leaves soil exposed at the start of the growing season. Risks increase when 
inputs to restore fertility, be they manure, green matter, or fertiliser are scarce or costly, and when 
the land cannot be fallowed. They rise when there is little alternative to farming for livelihoods 
and incomes depend on the land productivity. Often these combinations of circumstances mean 
that it those living on lands marginal for agriculture and in remote areas that are the most 
vulnerable to degradation. 
Two implications stand out. One is that, where the resources merit it, conservation needs to be 
encouraged. There are examples where this has happened in the recent past. For example, from 
the early 1950s onwards the degraded lands of Machakos, Kenya were conserved as farmers 
intensified production in response to market opportunities. Terracing, tree planting and enclosure 
of pastures took place to good effect: productivity per hectare rose. (Tiffen et al. 1994)  
Similarly and more recently, Reij  and  Smaling (2008) report on changes seen in the central 
plateau of Burkina Plateau an area in the 1970s marked by low rains, poor soils, low crop yields 
and much emigration. During the 1980s and 1990s the farming systems were intensified, with soil 
and water conservation —including the now famous stone lines and bunds of the Mossi plateau, 
tree planting, keeping livestock under semi-intensive systems and using the animal manure to 
fertilise fields. More grass and trees can now be seen from the air, water levels have risen in wells 
in areas conserved, and cereal yields have risen.18 Something similar has also taken place in 
neighbouring Niger, where farmers have been inspired to construct stone lines and bunds having 
seen examples in Burkina.  
Accounts of conservation sometimes mention how locals have produced their own variants on 
techniques introduced from outside, to very good effect — the ‘fanya juu’ terraces of Machakos 
being a good example. Adaptation to local circumstances is often necessary and this means giving 
locals the encouragement and space to devise their own solutions, even if the inspiration or the 
principles come from outside.  
Two, where the resources are of low productivity, it may be better for the poor to change the 
balance of their livelihoods spending more time in the rural non-farm economy, or through 
migration. Marginal fields may then be left to revert to nature. Examples of these kind of changes 
come from the hills of Nepal, where for long farmers have cultivated steep slopes with terraces. 
But in recent times the chance to migrate to the Terai, India and the Gulf, has produced local 
labour shortages and some of the terraces that required much work in maintenance have been 
abandoned (Thapa and Weber, 1995).   
iv. Other environmental issues 
What other environmental issues affect substantially the livelihoods of the rural poor? A short list 
might include:  
Pollution of air by smoke, especially within kitchens. This is a longstanding problem, arising 
from use of wood for cooking and heating on open fires and stoves. It is unlikely to worsen, since 
it is likely that rural households will increasingly either switch to other fuels, including kerosene 
and possibly even locally-produced biofuels, or use more efficient stoves, if only since the costs 
of collecting fuel wood rise and there are incentives to economise on its use; 
                                                  
18 A case study of one farmer’s struggle to improve his land is documented 
at:http://www.unesco.org/most/bpik2-2.htm 
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Reduced stocks of fish. A problem for the rural poor in coastal areas or close to large bodies of 
inland water, the key driver of over-exploitation — the demand for fish from larger populations 
with increasing incomes — is likely to intensify. Poor fisherfolk are liable to lose out to 
competition from capital intensive fishing — trawlers devastating the fishing grounds also used 
by artisan fishers; and from dispossession of access to inland waters as the rich and powerful 
claim exclusive rights over water bodies.  
Progress lies in getting agreements amongst fisherfolk to limit offtake, and making sure there is a 
fair division of quotas between artisan and commercial operations — that is, in establishing 
property rights for the competing users. These, are, however significant challenges;  
Deforestation can harm the rural poor when they are users of forest products, through local 
impacts on water supplies, and in the wider scheme, and through the contributions of 
deforestation to global warming and subsequent climate change. On the other hand, the rural poor 
may be active in clearing forests to create new fields and pastures, and when engaged in logging, 
so that deforestation may improve — at least in the short term — their livelihoods.  
The outlook is that pressures on forests are likely to increase as demand for timber and for new 
agricultural land rise. Given the recognition of the value of many tropical forests in regulating 
climate and ecosystems, finding ways to stem deforestation becomes an ever more pressing issue. 
For the rural poor who may gain from forestation, there are the challenges of finding decent 
livelihoods that do not entail forest clearance.  
Loss of biodiversity, including loss of ecosystems, species and genes. Loss of some ecosystems 
may harm the rural poor where they derive their livelihoods from the ecosystem — a good 
example being loss of forest for hunter-gatherer groups. The potential losses from reduced species 
and genes threaten them as they do everyone else through loss of resilience and adaptive capacity 
within the ecosphere. One specific impact for the rural poor may be that loss of genes may reduce 
their ability to mould and adapt local landraces of crops to specific environmental niches and to 
changing environmental conditions.  
The outlook is for the pressure on biodiversity to increase.  
In all but the first case, the challenges for defending both environmental goods and services and 
the livelihoods of the rural poor concern matters of managing common property, ensuring that 
externalities — including those that will apply to future generations — are fully valued in 
decision-making, and defending the rights of the poor from appropriation by richer and more 
powerful interests.  
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2d. Techno EPICs - technology and technological innovation  
The following discussion addresses emerging processes and issues in rural poverty with reference 
to technology. First, we discuss the expansion, spread and development of existing technologies. 
This includes biotechnology, vaccines and water and sanitation technology. Second, we discuss 
new(er) technologies. This includes industrial biofuels, ICTs and climate change technology. 
Third we discuss technological innovation itself. 
i. The spread of existing technologies 
Here we discuss biotechnology and transgenic techniques, vaccine technology and 
water/sanitation technology. 
The first, biotechnology and transgenics is a contentious subject. The area is attracting very large 
and growing investments and is largely driven by private sector interests although this has been 
challenged. Intellectual Property Rights and piracy are notable trends as some farmers mix local 
hybrid seeds and GM seeds. The IAASTD report called for a deeper study into the environmental, 
economic and social impacts of GM crops. However, a number of influential organizations and 
individuals have provided strong endorsement that modern biotechnology has significant 
potential in developing countries to raise agricultural productivity in a more environmentally 
friendly manner, enhance food security, and contribute to the alleviation of poverty (Byerlee and 
Fischer, 2002; Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 1999; Pinstrup-Andersen and Cohen, 2000; Royal 
Society of London, 2000; Serageldin and Persley, 2000; Spillane, 2000). 
Countries such as India, China and Brazil have relatively large funds allocated to 
biotechnological research. Progressively, biotechnology has been placed high on the agenda in 
countries like Indonesia, Philippines and Malaysia (Pender, 2007: 137). 
Donors provide between US$40 million and US$50 million per year for agro-biotechnology and 
the CGIAR which brings together the key Green Revolution research institutions is a major 
source of investments (Horstkotte-Wesseler and Byerlee, 2000; Byerlee and Fischer, 2002). 
Various type of funding is offered, for instance ‘direct funding research (e.g., the Rockefeller 
Foundation), supporting public–private partnerships and technology transfer (e.g., USAID), 
capacity building (the World Bank), and participatory needs assessment (the Netherlands)’ and 
several multidonor initiatives (Byerlee and Ficsher, 2002: 935). The Rockefeller Foundation and 
the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation recently announced a joint $150 million Alliance for a 
Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA), provoking immediate criticisms that the proposal fails to 
take into account the failures of the original Green Revolution (Holt-Gimenez et al., 2006: 1). 
Glover (2003a) argues there are three future trends. First, in the area of research and development 
there are concerns that investment in genetic engineering is diverting attention and resources from 
other promising technologies. Second, IPR is most likely to not encourage research in subsistence 
crops and traits pertinent to marginal farmers. At the same time, one can see larger developing 
countries taking advantage of the flexibilities in the TRIPS agreements to serve their own goals 
by allowing resowing, saving, exchange and even sell their seeds. Third, due to continuing 
commercialisation biotechnology development will be largely driven by the private sector rather 
than the needs of the poor. 
Vaccines are also attracting large investments. Vaccines represent nearly an $8 billion industry 
(or 2% of the global pharmaceutical market) and are projected to grow to $10 billion in 2010. In 
2001, worldwide spending on R and D for ‘‘biologicals,’’ of which vaccines are the largest 
segment, was $1.1 billion (about 4% of the total private pharmaceutical R and D) (Srinivas, 2006: 
 42
1742, Morel et al., 2005: 401-405). Much research is focused on vaccines for pneumonia and 
malaria. New funding sources such as the Global Funds and the Global Alliance on Vaccines and 
Immunisation (GAVI) encourage new pathways for developing countries to access these new 
vaccines. In spite of all the above the rates of immunization are stagnant, even dropping in many 
sub-Saharan countries and policy and health professionals wrongly assume that it is ignorance or 
misinformation that leads to lack of uptake of vaccines. The real reasons relate to vaccination 
approaches need to be more socio-culturally sensitive. (Leach and Turquet, 2006: 31). 
Third, water and sanitation technology. WaterAid (2007: 2) note how the water and sanitation 
MDGs are the 2015 goals least likely to be achieved despite affecting child morbidity and child 
and maternal mortality. They argue there is a lack of interest among the donor community and 
national governments. Sanitation technology has always been the mandate of the professional 
engineers and sanitation experts. In this setting, there have been only a few major technologies 
for toilet constructions. These are the aqua privy and soakaway model, the single or double pit 
latrine, ventilated improved pit latrines etc. Often the model selection has not been matched with 
the environmental factors of the community like climate, soil type, population density, type of 
houses etc. This has resulted in unsustainable toilets which are either unusable or are used by the 
family as a storage room etc. 
How is the adaptive capacity of the rural poor strengthened or constrained with respect to their 
access to markets, livelihoods, natural resources, services and governance? 
Biotechnology optimists also advocate that it is the rural farmers and poor who will benefit the 
most from higher yields, lower risks, and larger outputs which will control the growth of food 
prices. Sceptics argue that it is the poor who suffer the most because biotechnology exacerbates 
trends towards industrialization of agriculture, erosion of the diversity of agro eco systems and 
undermining farmers’ rights. As in most debates, there is no conclusive argument and both sides 
have evidence to back their argument (see for details, Keeley 2003). 
One can see potential in biotechnology in many developing countries like South Africa, China 
and India. In China Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt cotton) has been reported to have increased yields, 
financial savings, reduction in pesticide use. India has also shown dramatically increased 
purchase in Bt cotton (Glover, 2003b). However, biotechnology has often proved to hinder 
farmers’ livelihoods. If yields are destroyed or do not increase, the farmers may have to incur 
greater losses (due to the higher price of these seeds) and this would not only negatively effect 
livelihoods but also access to markets and credit services (in case of inability to repay loans). 
There is no conclusive research indicating the effects of biotechnology on natural resources like 
water, biodiversity, soil fertility, most importantly the complex ecosystems. This is not surprising 
when all innovations are lumped under the heading of ‘biotech’. If we take individual 
innovations, then we can test propositions. 
 
In the long run, this may result in lower soil fertility, decreased biodiversity and negative effects 
on the ecosystem. There is a concern in India and China about emerging pest resistance to Bt 
cotton. Like in biofuels, there are measures that can be implemented by various players at all 
levels to make biotechnology pro-poor. Policy and regulatory frameworks in international and 
national level governance, IPR laws and democratizing biotechnology in rural areas at the local 
level can seek to address these (Wakeford  and  Pimbert, 2003). 
In terms of access to vaccines, the rural poor are especially vulnerable to diseases like malaria, 
measles etc. There are 30 million children lacking the ‘basic six’ vaccines. Improved vaccine 
technology might result in greater access to vaccinations and thereby substantially reduce health 
risks and morbidities. A decrease in diseases would result in physical well being and more 
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capabilities leading to secure livelihoods and more savings (due to lesser health expenditure). 
Also the demand for vaccines may create a larger market in rural parts thereby generating 
employment opportunities for the rural population as health workers etc. 
More than 40% of the world’s population lacks access to basic sanitation technology. WaterAid 
(2007) states that lack of sanitation and water is the second largest killer in the world. Lack of 
sanitation leads (directly and indirectly) to various diseases like cholera, diarrhoea, jaundice. 
Access to sanitation can improve livelihoods drastically. 
ii. New(er) technologies 
In this section we discuss new technologies - biofuel technologies, ICTs and climate change 
technologies. 
First, Biofuel technologies. Biofuels like wood and charcoal have been used to generate energy 
for decades. However, what is new is the industrial processing to make these biofuels cleaner and 
more efficient than traditional forms of biofuel and the blending and production of them on a 
scale for large-scale usage. From the early 2000s there have been sharp increases and spatial 
proliferation in the production of biofuel, almost quadrupling between 2002–2006 according to 
OECD estimates, global trade is also expanding rapidly, triggered by biofuel targets set in various 
countries in combination with uneven conditions for feedstock and biofuel production (Mol, 
2007: 300). 
Biofuels have a high place on the global agenda, largely due to rising concerns about national 
energy security, higher energy prices, and increasing concerns about global climate change, as 
well as the income expectations of farmers and other investors (Braun and Pachauri, 2006). The 
Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) has schemes to offer funding to 
developing countries to start biofuel projects. However, the ability of substantial GHG reduction 
depends on the type of cultivation, the crop under cultivation, the technologies used for 
processing etc. Oil prices rises triggered by energy demand in India and China has also led to 
biofuel investments as an alternative energy. Major fuel importing countries’ (especially EU and 
the US) dependence on large imports from regions like Russia and Middle East have triggered 
these former countries into launching programmes to lower their dependence on fossil fuel and 
increase their national energy security. 
Bioenergy’s potential is expected to increase as second-generation technologies become more 
widely available, enabling more efficient conversion of cellulose-rich biomass to transport fuels 
and electricity. According to Hazell and Pachauri (2006: 3), technology advances will not only 
help make bioenergy more competitive with fossil fuels on price, but will also expand the range 
of feedstock that can be used, some of which (like fast-growing grasses and trees) can thrive in 
less fertile and more drought-prone regions that are less competitive with food and feed than 
current feedstock like sugarcane, maize, and rapeseed. Many developing countries such as India 
and China see great potential investing in biofuel in rural areas. This would not only generate 
income through potential exports and domestic consumers but also provide employment for the 
rural populations. 
Second, ICTs. The range of ICT technologies is increasing all the time and ‘there is a 
convergence between the new technologies and conventional media’ (Michiels and Van Crowder, 
2001: 8). Thus most devices can now be linked to others to share and exchange information.  
There is also the US$100 laptop launched this summer and web 2.0 (highly interactive internet 
sites), advances in enabling technical architectures (interoperability, open standards, XML-based 
modular designs) and a range of communication related sites such as peer-to-peer collaboration, 
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social networking sites, volunteer-created sources of knowledge such as Wikipedia, alternative 
news services and trading systems such as eBay. 
There are very large donor and private investments in ICTs. The OECD DAC has documented a 
matrix of around 50 multilateral and DAC members who are involved in funding ICT related 
projects all over the world. Companies like Microsoft are taking keen interest in ICT related 
development programmes, especially in rapidly developing countries such as India. Microsoft has 
been one of the biggest investors in ICT related programmes. It is one of the biggest donor and 
partner in most of the big projects (MSSRF, NASSCOM etc.) under the umbrella alliance of 
Mission 2007 ‘Every village a knowledge centre’. Many governments are developing e-
governance networks and ICT4D projects. NGOs are also investing in projects based on ICTs and 
development. They range from simple service delivery to participatory community owned ICT 
projects. Farmers and rural communities are not only involved in participatory ICT4D 
programmes but are also emerging consumers for these technologies. This is most apparent in the 
widespread use of mobile phones in rural communities. Subscriber rates have doubled in Africa 
and are increasing by 25% in most developing countries (Miller, 2007: 1). 
Third, climate change technologies. There is increasing evidence proving that energy efficiency, 
carbon pricing and lowering carbon emissions are effective solutions for the short term but not for 
the long term. This is because, for instance, carbon pricing through national policies and 
international agreements can never be fully credible, the economics of risk point towards 
development and deployment of technologies etc (Stern, 2007: 347). 
For longer term climate change objectives, there is an urgent need for new or highly improved 
technology in sectors like power generation, transport, and energy use (Stern, 2007: 347, Coninck 
et al., 2007: 4).  CEPS (2007) goes further to explain that we will need a broad range of 
technologies: clean coal technologies, various renewables, carbon capture and storage, nuclear, to 
name but a few and energy storage systems, for both stationary applications and transport. 
How is the adaptive capacity of the rural poor strengthened or constrained with respect to their 
access to markets, livelihoods, natural resources, services and governance? 
Debates on Biofuel technology and its impact on the rural poor are fraught (Clancy, 2008). They 
relate to food security for the poor, energy-effectiveness (energy consumption to grow feedstock 
for the fuels), ownership of processing units, energy security for the poor and land use amongst 
other factors. Ideally, biofuels will give farmers the ability to tap into the energy market through 
their purpose-grown produce or the waste of their produce. Also biofuels are known to generate 
large scale semi/unskilled employment in rural areas but this is only in Brazil (Braun and 
Pachauri 2006: 7). The global trends in biofuel production indicate that higher biofuel production 
would positively impact the net exporters of biofuels like Argentina and Brazil. 
However, there are others who don’t see a very clear link of biofuels and poverty. Slater (2008) 
for example, stresses on the points that biofuels potential to be pro-poor are very context specific 
and how it is difficult to make generalisations. Biofuels impact on poverty depends on economies 
of scale, type of crop selected, the type of labour force required from the rural poor population 
etc. She also states how biofuels may run into the same problems that follow the increase in 
production of the classic cash crops. 
Clancy (2008) too poses similar questions about poverty reduction and biofuels. She explores the 
complexities regarding food security, environmental concerns, and employment and gender 
issues. She poses the question of whether liquid biofuels help poor people by providing transport 
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fuels and explores how in Brazil employment in biofuels production has been comparatively low 
and has led to internal migration due to the seasonal nature of biofuel employment.  
The IFPRI IMPACT model has predicted the prices of food namely oilseeds and maize. This 
analysis is done under two scenarios. First is the scenario with biofuel production growing as 
planned by the countries and the second, biofuel production growing at two times the rate in 
scenario 1. Under the planned biofuel expansion scenario (Scenario 1), prices increase for 
oilseeds by 18% and for maize by 26%. With the more drastic biofuel expansion scenario 
(Scenario 2), the rise of corn prices goes to 72% and oilseeds to 44% (Braun, 2007: 5). Also, 
increases in biofuel production in the OECD food exporting countries would drive up the food 
prices and make the developing importing countries vulnerable to price shocks (Peskett et al. 
2007: 3). The IFPRI IMPACT model further goes on to analyse the impact on poverty with 
increase in production along with improvement in biofuel technology and farming technologies 
and innovations (Rosegrant et al. 2006, Braun  and  Pachauri, 2006). This analysis shows a 
marked difference in the increase in food prices with and without technological improvement. 
Second generation technology would mitigate food insecurity by a substantial margin and 
therefore have a positive impact on poverty. According to Rosegrant et al. (2006) this scenario 
seems most plausible since neither the national government nor the feedstock producers would 
indulge in large scale production without sufficient and cost effective supply of feedstock and 
food produce. 
Tropical countries that have a comparative advantage in biofuel production may be able to 
promote employment and food security (Peskett et al., 2007: 1). However, biofuel production 
may take over land and crops that is presently used for food crops. This may drive the food prices 
up and benefit the farmers but not the non farming poor and the drop in energy prices may not 
positively affect the poor. Slater (2008) questions if there is verifiable evidence that demonstrates 
land being shifted from food production to biofuel production. In depth analysis has to consider 
the different feedstocks/production systems, varying downstream transportation) costs, existing 
(non-biofuel) crop production and processing patterns, and patterns of land holding (Braun, 2007: 
7). 
Peskett et al., (2007: 3) divide the issues according to on and off farm activities. The expansion of 
the biofuel market is often beneficial to the large scale farmers or private companies which can 
achieve economies of scale in production. This is questionable if there are economies of scale in 
producing feedstock. In processing scale economies apply. Other challenges include change in 
cropping patterns resulting in lower soil rejuvenation and fertility, water pollution and 
‘downstream effects such as draining of wet lands’. Off farm challenges include more demand for 
skilled labour along with unskilled ones, large up front investments for processing and 
distribution units, converting current production systems into biofuel compatible systems (for 
instance, the sugar mills in Brazil (Braun and Pachauri, 2006: 8), adapting regulations. 
There is a variety of literature that provides evidence that ICTs have the potential to reduce 
poverty in all sectors i.e. health, livelihoods, education and agriculture (see for review Scott et al., 
2008). 
 
There is however, a very distinct urban and rural divide in the case of ICTs which is widening. 
This divide results in the marginalization of rural population in markets, policies, and services. 
Efforts to narrow the divide have not been successful. To keep apace with the highly dynamic fast 
paced and complex markets, suitable information and knowledge for farmers and other rural 
businesses is necessary. A recognition of this has led to concern for dissemination of ‘necessary’ 
information through ICTs. ICTs have gained importance as a medium to access markets which 
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were not accessible to the rural poor or rural poor organisations previously. ICTs are also seen as 
important to disseminate information for new on and off farm methods and technologies. 
Warning and mitigation have become mandatory in the world we live in today with climate 
change related risks of disasters. ICTs have demonstrated their potential as periodic information 
systems and early warning systems; both very crucial in disaster and risk management. 
Traditional and new technological systems can be put in place to work effectively, depending on 
the geographical, socio-economic, political architecture (Wattegama, 2007: 9). ICTs could have 
three types of benefits. These will be incremental benefits and transformational and production 
benefits. The first will help people do what they were already doing, but in a cheaper and faster 
way. And the second implies that ICTs will offer new methods to access services and livelihoods. 
And the third implies that ICTs will hold new opportunities for the rural communities to sell and 
other related activities (Miller 2006: 1). On the other hand, increased ICT hardware waste in 
developing countries, either dumped by developed countries or the increased use the developing 
country themselves (without proper disposal systems) will result in environmental hazards. 
ICTs thus have the potential to enable the rural communities to access markets and access 
multiple and improved livelihoods. ICTs can also dramatically improve access to services 
through mobile banking, mobile knowledge extension services, mobile micro enterprise services 
(as done in Bangladesh, India), and credit facilities through organisations like Kiva. 
Third, is climate change. Many of the rural poor depend on agriculture related activities and 
climate acts as a big threat to them. Also, there is grave threat of climate change leading to 
conflict over scarce resources and resulting scarcities associated with resource scarcity (for 
instance, water leading to inefficient agriculture, migration to inland areas resulting in scarce 
jobs). Climate change technology will enable adaptation, thereby increasing livelihood 
opportunities and lower the associated risks. 
Lower emissions through technology will enhance the sustainability of agriculture as a livelihood 
and mitigate environmental risks (droughts and floods). Technology for climate change is vital 
for the survival of fisher-folk and other coastline dwellers. The production of biofuels for 
emission reduction will increase rural on and off farm opportunities. Also, the rural population 
may involve themselves in innovating and operating climate change technology for a living. 
Climate change technology can also lead to better infrastructure such as water storage tanks and 
other water harvesting mechanisms. Certain climate change technologies enable access to timely 
information to facilitate adaptation and disaster management and other related services. For 
instance, disaster management training services etc. (Pachauri, 2008). 
iii. Technological innovation 
Reaching the MDGs requires new and more effective solutions to the obstacles facing the rural 
poor and concerted action to increase access to and upscale these solutions. IFAD’s work 
specifically focuses on enabling the rural poor to overcome their poverty, promote equity and 
gender equality, and increase productivity by: (i) strengthening their capacities, their 
organisations and building sustainable institutions, (ii) improving equitable access to productive 
natural resources and technologies and (iii) increasing access to financial services and markets. 
To achieve these objectives, the need for innovation and sharing successful experiences has long 
been recognised, for example by international agencies such as IFAD which has developed an 
‘Innovation Strategy’ (2007). This takes a pro-poor people-centred approach and promotes the 
integration of innovation into development operations and processes. Innovation is not an isolated 
activity, but locally-driven, field oriented, based on partnership with rural actors, flexible and 
responsive to need. Innovation processes and results also need to be carefully monitored and 
evaluated in order to ensure they successfully address priorities and challenges of the rural poor, 
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mitigates risks for poor people and lessons and knowledge gained are shared. IFAD (2007) 
defines innovations as ‘processes that add value or solve problems faced by the rural poor in new 
ways… These encompass institutional and technological approaches, as well as pro-poor policies 
and partnerships’. 
 
Freeman classified four types of technological innovations (Stern 2007: 348). Each one of the 
types corresponds with one of the major technologies we have focused on in the report. First is 
the ‘incremental innovations represent the continuous improvements of existing products through 
improved quality, design and performance’ (ibid). ICTs are a good example of continuing 
innovation through the above stated characteristics. One of the main reasons for mobile phones to 
have latched on to the rural poor at this speed is due to the supply driven innovations for the rural 
communities. In a very short period of time, mobile phone companies have come up with prepaid 
cards, options of native languages as options etc.  Second, is ‘radical innovations are new 
inventions that lead to a significant departure from previous production methods’ (ibid). The 
innovations in Bt cotton and local hybrid seeds by the farmers and the local seed company 
‘Navbharat’ in Gujarat demonstrates a radical innovation. Many farmers claim that these seeds 
have increased their yield more than pure Bt Cotton seeds. Third are ‘changes in the technological 
systems occur at the system level when a cluster of radical innovations impact on several 
branches of the economy, as would take place in a shift to a low-emission economy(ibid).’ As 
stated by Stern, climate change technology corresponds to this type of technology. A shift to low 
emission economy would not only require large scale production of bioenergy but also a shift in 
‘several branches of the economy’ such as the automotive industry, the petroleum industry etc’. 
Fouth, changes of techno-economic paradigm occur when technology change impacts on every 
other branch of the economy, for instance the internet. The internet has changed resulted in a 
major shift in economic opportunities, the transaction cost of several businesses across the globe 
and governance structures in not only developed countries, but in developing countries too.  
How is the adaptive capacity of the rural poor strengthened or constrained with respect to their 
access to markets, livelihoods, natural resources, services and governance? 
There is no doubt that innovations can impact the rural poor directly (mobile phones) and 
indirectly (reduction in emissions from cars), but as mentioned above. Innovations also enhance 
opportunities, and competitiveness in an increasingly globalised world.  
In order for access to innovations, there are certain conditions that have been identified by 
Hussein et al., (2008) in ‘Promoting technological innovation and innovative practices for rural 
poverty reduction in Western and Central Africa’. They are as follows:  
? Use of participatory technology development and dissemination approaches;  
? Strong partnerships between farmers, their organisations, research, government agents 
and other private sector actors; 
? Strong synergies between the formal and informal sources of knowledge and  innovation; 
? Access to finance and credit at a scale and level relevant to small farmers, women and 
youth in particular; 
? An institutional context that encourages innovation and fosters learning organisations; 
? Global networks focused on the dialogue among all innovators. 
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III. GOVERNANCE AND THE EPICS 
3a. Governance across the EPICS 
A strongly recurring theme across the EPICs is that of governance.19 For example, aid governance 
is related to the markets EPICs via the reforms at the IMF changing trade/market access 
negotiations, to the tying of Chinese aid to trade and investment and the emergence of regional 
integration, notably via EU and NEPAD. It is also linked to the demographic and technology 
EPICs because of the increased funding of health and agriculture technology by private 
foundations and expected decreases in disease burdens as a result. Supply chain governance is – 
of course - also strongly linked to the market EPICs because it relates to markets themselves. 
Economics and market linkages to governance include: Changes in the systems of governance of 
the IMF through an expansion of the quota system may lead to more influence of developing 
countries over economic policy.  The increased presence of China in Africa may lead to an 
increase in trade and improved access to Chinese markets for the rural poor through better 
investment in infrastructure. Moreover, increasing regional cooperation carries the  potential for 
high economic cooperation between member states, better bargaining power for producers  within 
regional entities and expansion of markets. The globalisation of markets is leading to increased 
trade in natural resources which in turn is leading certain nations to ignore rights based 
governance and also become less responsive to the demands of its citizens. The strengthening of 
RPOs is intended to allow rural producers to engage with globally integrated markets better and 
increase their bargaining power in free market systems. The link of New Public Management and 
Public Private Partnerships with markets is that they are founded on the principle of market-based 
competition in provision of public services.   
Demographics and employment linkages to governance include:  The dramatic rise in funding 
from new philanthropic foundations to the health sector may lead to a decreased disease burden.  
Emerging modalities of governing international supply chains may lead to improved working 
conditions and greater regional integration may lead to greater mobility of labour and possibly 
more job opportunities. Along with these potentially positive changes, the increased dependence 
of certain countries on aid and natural resources for revenue will lead to decreased quality of 
governance in rural areas which may impact of rural livelihoods and migration strategies. 
Environment and natural resources linkages to governance include: The emergence of China as a 
donor has potentially negative impacts on the environment as Chinese aid is outside the OECD 
guidelines. Expansion of decentralization might lead to populations having a greater say over 
their environment which in turn might lead to better environmental management. 
Technology and technological innovation linkages to governance include: The emergence of new 
philanthropic foundations will lead to an increase in funding for innovation in health and 
agriculture technology. The links of emerging trends in governance with technology are also 
evident as the globalisation of social movements is being facilitated by the use of sophisticated 
information technology.  
3b. Governance and aid, value chains and the private sector and public services 
In particular, there are three arenas of governance that reoccur throughout our discussion. For 
each of these governance arenas we can discuss governance responses. The first arena is aid 
                                                  
19 Cross EPICs interactions are also tangible across the EPICs (see annex 1 for examples). 
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governance. The second is the supply chains/private sector/globally integrated markets 
governance. The third is the public services governance. Each can be further sub-divided between 
changes in context/institutions and changes in actors and roles (see box 3). Each has implications 
for the rural poor (RP). 
Box 3. Three Governance Arenas  
Governance Arena A: Governing Aid 
There is new aid governance via,  
? The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, signed in 2005 (to be reviewed in Sept. 
2008). 
? The IMF is reviewing its quota system.  
? The emergence of new state donors amongst the BRICS.  
? The emergence of large private donors.  
? The emergence of stronger regional integration bodies in North and South such as EU 
and NEPAD and NEPAD CAADP in particular. 
In sum, 
? New contexts/institutions: The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and reforms in 
IMF voting rights; 
? New actors and roles: New donors such as China and the Philanthropic Foundations, new 
roles for the EU following enlargement and NEPAD. 
Governance Arena B: Governing Value-Chains, the Private Sector and Globally Integrated 
Markets 
There is changing value-chains governance via, 
? The emergence of globally integrated markets.  
? The proliferation of international conventions and global technical institutions.  
? The emergence of (largely voluntary) supply-chain codes of conduct.  
? The strengthening of RPOs (Rural Producer Organisations  
? The new roles of transnational CSOs in international supply chains and their 
collaboration with local and national social movements.  
In sum, 
? New contexts/institutions: the emergence of international supply chains and proliferation 
of international conventions. 
? New actors and roles: the rise of regional aid initiatives such as NEPAD and CAADP, the 
new roles of transnational CSOs in international supply chains and in providing support 
to local and national social movements. 
Governance Arena C: Governing Public Services 
There is changing public services governance via, 
? New Public Management and Public Private Partnerships.  
? Greater calls for citizen’s voices in public service delivery.  
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? The increased in state funding from increases in aid and/or natural resource revenues.  
? Global social movements in response to privatisation and globalisation of public services.  
? The reduction of civil space and freedoms in many countries. 
? Increased decentralisation of service delivery  
In sum, 
? New institutions: Greater calls for citizen voice in public services at a time when there 
are decreases in democratic space and adoption of counter terrorism measures/legislation. 
 
? New actors and roles: the changing roles of states due to changes in state financing, the 
expansion of state decentralisation, the increased role of private actors in service delivery 
in modalities of PPP and via the emergence of new agencies under the New Public 
Management paradigm. 
 
i. Governance and aid 
One can identify various governance responses as follows in this arena:  
The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, signed in 2005 is to be reviewed in September 2008. 
The Paris Declaration seeks to provide principles for donor-recipient relationships based on 5 
principles – ownership (of partner countries), alignment (of donors and partner countries), 
harmonisation (of donors-donors), results based management and mutual accountability. There is 
also a shift to budget-support. Participation of civil society in processes has been mixed and the 
nature of true participation contentious. There are 12 indicators of aid effectiveness including 
alignment, harmonisation, and ownership (see table 5). The main indicator is that more countries 
will have national development strategies (for further discussion on agriculture see Cabral, 2008). 
Table 5. Paris Declaration principles and Indicators 
 
The IMF is reviewing its quota system. Quota subscriptions generate most of the IMF's financial 
resources. Each member country of the IMF is assigned a quota, based broadly on its relative size 
in the world economy. A member's quota determines its maximum financial commitment to the 
IMF and its voting power, and has a bearing on its access to IMF financing. The reforms are 
broadly founded on the principle of extending more voice to developing countries by an increase 
in voting shares with a particular emphasis on African countries. The quota system will be 
reviewed every five years to ensure the voice of developing countries continues to grow (see for 
further discussion IMF, 2008; WDM, 2006). 
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The emergence of new state donors amongst the BRICS+. These donors such as China, Brazil, 
India, China and the N11 (next 11) tend to blend aid (grants and loans) with non-aid modalities 
(including state-led FDI, infrastructure, trade policy and payment ‘in-kind’). New donor’s aid 
does not necessarily come with the kind of conditionalities common to aid arrangements and may 
not for example conform to OECD best practice standards – e.g. in terms of environmental 
impact and social standards. Such new (state) donors arguably also place importance on geo-
political consideration in their aid relationships (see for further discussion, Kurlantzick, 2006; 
Lönnqvist, 2007).  
The emergence of large private donors. The influence of new philanthropic initiatives, 
exemplified by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation is being felt increasingly.  The annual 
budget of the Gates foundation are greater than the Official Development Assistance of ten of the 
twenty-two OECD Development Assistance Committee members. The Foundations are 
redefining the ‘rules of the game’ of aid in at least two inter-related ways. First, the expansion of 
the private sector in traditionally public sector domains. Second, the increased dominance of 
Northern actors as foundations often channel aid through northern NGOs, public private 
partnerships, international organisations and bilateral aid programmes and tend to not favour 
direct grants to developing states (see for discussion, Moran, 2008). 
The establishment of global challenge funds. This includes funds for health and the MCA. There 
have also been recent moves to establish a fund for African agriculture, (though African 
governments may not keen to see the establishment of a potential rival to CAADP). Although it is 
not a challenge fund, there is also the Millennium Villages Project which argues that the most 
effective way to address poverty in Africa is by trying to deliver effective assistance as directly to 
the village as is possible. 
 
The emergence of stronger regional integration bodies in North and South such as EU and 
NEPAD and NEPAD CAADP in particular. The EU following expansion, accounts for half of 
global ODA and is the largest trading partner for many developing countries (and EPAs have 
been contentious recently). The EU is likely to become more of a global player. It is likely to 
promote what its declared EU values – notably liberal democracy and human rights. The NEPAD 
is another example of strengthening regional integration. It was ratified by the African Union in 
2002 with three primary objectives, the eradication of poverty, the sustainable growth and 
development of African nations and the increased empowerment of women (see for discussion, 
Kotze and Steyn, 2002; Mbaku, 2004). An important component of NEPAD for rural poverty is 
the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP). CAADP aims to 
improve yields, improve access to agricultural markets, and increase exports. In particular, the 
CAADP hopes to increase the capacity of private entrepreneurs including commercial and small-
holder farmers, to promote regional and cross-country trade. What’s special about CAADP? a. 
It’s Africa owned. b. It represents a re-commitment to farming, above all in the Maputo 
declaration of 2003 that at least 10% of budgets should go to agriculture (see for further detail 
FAO, 2008; NEPAD, 2008).  
How is the adaptive capacity of the rural poor strengthened or constrained with respect to their 
access to markets, livelihoods, natural resources, services and governance? 
In sum, the main changes in aid governance are as follows:  
• New institutions: The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and reforms in IMF voting 
rights; 
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• New actors and roles: New donors such as China and the Philanthropic Foundations, new 
roles for the EU following enlargement and NEPAD. 
The consequence of changes in aid governance suggests two things relevant to the RP. 
i. More aid and more diverse aid. There will be large increases in aid from various sources 
and a greater diversity and new types of aid.  
ii. More voice for national governments internationally. Potentially more voice for the rural 
poor but this depends on national governance structures. 
How will these changes likely affect the RP access challenges? Access of the RP governance 
could increase but this depends on pre-requisites (see background paper to chapter 6). Access to 
natural resources, markets, multiple livelihoods and services are then all a function of RP access 
to governance structures. 
Access to governance and access to services of the RP could improve. The Paris Declaration is 
largely owned by central government with participation of civil society encouraged but 
led/convened by national governments. The implications for the rural poor and their organisations 
is there is an entry point to influence policy processes but with a gatekeeper.  
Aid does not necessarily strengthen states but, overtime, can potentially weaken them (see for 
discussion, Van de Walle, 2001). This is because the state instead of being accountable to the 
citizen, tends to orient itself externally.   
The impact on domestic governance of new donor relationships is unclear. Chinese aid is outside 
of the DAC best-practice approach. The increasing amount of Chinese debt being accumulated by 
some African nations is concerning. Africa already relies heavily on China for certain 
manufactured goods (as we all do). Africa might one day be a large market, but right now and for 
the next 10 years the big markets are not in Africa. African exports (especially of natural 
resources) continue to expand arguably leading to a form of economic growth that is not pro-poor 
and that may be governance-distorting (see later discussion). The influence of private 
philanthropic foundations continues to expand too. The Paris Declaration may lead to more 
effective aid delivery (if assessment is made on its own indicators noted above).   
ii. Governance and value chains and the private sector 
One can identify various governance responses as follows in this arena:  
The emergence of globally integrated markets. Supply chains have created a number of 
international governance questions because they have led to a reduction in the regulatory capacity 
of the state due to the split between the national political structures and the international 
structures of production (see for discussion, Macdonald, 2004; Thompson et al., 2007).  
 
The emergence of (largely voluntary) supply-chain codes of conduct. There are a multiplicity of 
such codes including corporate codes, the OECD multinationals code, industry association codes, 
multi-stakeholder codes and NGO-driven codes, fairtrade and other forms of consumer labelling 
(see for more details Keohane and Nye, 2000; MacDonald, 2004). 
 
The strengthening of Rural Producer Organisations (RPOs). The liberalisation of markets that 
started in the 1980s led to the reduction of government support to small, rural producers and 
exposed them to fluctuations of a free market. In response there has been an increasing 
collectivization of rural producers seen through emerging producer organisations like co-
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operatives and farmer’s associations.  Though co-operatives have existed for many decades, the 
1990s saw renewed interest in supporting them, after a decline in funding for them in 1980s. 
There was a period, dating roughly from the late 1950s to the mid-1970s when there were high 
hopes for farmer co-operatives - dealing specifically with marketing and input supply. Based in 
part on the success of some farmer co-operatives in parts of Europe, and partly on a political 
preference for co-operatives rather than private enterprise, many developing countries support 
encouraged the formation of such associations with the active support of donors. Although some 
co-operatives were undoubtedly effective and successful, there were also many disappointments 
⎯ arising above all from leadership and management that were either inefficient or corrupt or 
both. Consequently, enthusiasm for farmer co-operatives waned notably in the 1980s and 1990s 
(See for greater discussion see background paper to RPR chapter 6 and case studies).  
The new roles of transnational CSOs in international supply chains and their collaboration with 
local and national social movements. There is a proliferation of transnational CSOs/NGOs 
involved in value-chain advocacy in solidarity with local and national social movements, trade 
unions and workers groups (see for more discussion Goodwin and Jasper 2003; Leach and 
Scoones, 2007).  
How is the adaptive capacity of the rural poor strengthened or constrained with respect to their 
access to markets, livelihoods, natural resources, services and governance? 
 
In sum, the main changes in value-chain governance are as follows:  
• New contexts/institutions: the emergence of international supply chains and proliferation 
of international conventions and codes of conduct. 
• New actors and roles: the rise of regional integration in NEPAD CAADP, the new roles 
of transnational CSOs in international supply chains and in providing support to local and 
national social movements. 
The consequence of changes in value-chain governance suggests two things relevant to the RP. 
i. Greater integration between local and global markets.  
ii. Greater linkages between transnational and local CSOs on value-chains.  
How will these changes likely affect the RP access challenges? The emergence of globally 
integrated markets hold potential for the RP to access those markets. Whilst the emergence of 
global solidarity campaigns might leverage RP access to governance over those markets. 
However, the barriers to entry may be insurmountably high (see economics EPICs) and global 
solidarity is no guarantee of access to governance structures. 
RPOs can contribute to supporting RP access to markets and RP governance. The networking of 
small producers leads to more equitable negotiations with buyers on behalf of producers, 
facilitates increased specialisation through knowledge and resource sharing and lastly, fosters 
solidarity and confidence amongst small producers. There is also an issue of access of the rural 
poor to RPOs. Most smallholder co-ops and producer organisations are driven by the better-off 
small farmers and not the rural poor. 
The NEPAD CAADP also has the potential to increase access to markets of the RP. In particular, 
the CAADP hopes to increase the capacity of private entrepreneurs including commercial and 
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small-holder farmers, to promote regional and cross-country trade.  
These are to be realised through various measures, including the provision of information on the 
export market and appropriate training, promoting better farming and manufacturing technologies 
and removing barriers to the cross border movement of goods.  
The impact of codes of conduct and international solidarity remains to be seen. On the one hand 
the non-enforcement of international governance could lead to the further exploitation of workers 
by multinational corporations. However, mobilization and transnational solidarity could empower 
workers through new forms of ‘civil regulation’.  
 
Though effective in bringing about some kind of institutionalised accountability within industry, 
codes of conduct can devalue other emerging governance institutions as these codes are 
sometimes promoted by industry themselves to exercise control.  Though there could be a number 
of reasons for the emergence of these institutions, two central ones could include the increase in 
the density of networks and the increased intensity of contact within networks.   
 
What will be the impact on diverse rural livelihoods? Changes in value-chains (and market 
EPICs) via prices in particular and labour supply have clear impacts on RW 1 and such impacts 
are transmitted to RW 3 and 4 who they may employ. In the past risks were reduced by state 
involvement in production via marketing boards, public investments in agriculture R and D and 
agricultural services. This is no longer the case in many countries leaving the RP to bear market 
risk. 
iii. Governance and public service delivery 
One can identify various governance and rural poor responses as follows in this arena:  
New Public Management and Public Private Partnerships. These new public services modalities 
are based on the adoption of private sector management practices in the public sector; an 
emphasis on efficiency; a movement away from input controls, rules and procedures toward 
output measurement and performance targets; a preference for private ownership, competitive 
tendering and contracting out of public services; and the devolution of management control with 
improved reporting and monitoring mechanisms (for greater detail see Hood, 2007).  
Greater calls for citizen’s voices in public service delivery. Gaventa and Valderrama (1999: 2) 
refer to ‘citizenship participation’ or ‘direct ways in which citizens influence and exercise control 
in governance’. This means that people can assert their citizenship through seeking greater 
accountability via participation in policy processes and claiming such activities by right rather 
than by invitation. This is particularly so in the case of public services. Citizens have moved 
‘from being simply users or choosers of public services policies made by others, to ‘makers and 
shapers’ of policies themselves.’ (Gaventa, 2004: 150). There are new arenas for citizen 
participation at various levels. At a local level in programmes of democratic decentralization (i.e. 
planning, budgeting and monitoring of public services), at a national level (in sectoral 
programmes, poverty policies and PRSPs) and at a global level in policies of global governance 
and treaties and conventions and summits. Such trend have changed the role of states to creating 
an ‘an enabling environment’ where the poor have an incentives to mobilise (for greater 
discussion on public services see in particular, Goetz and Gaventa (2001). 
The increases in state funding from increases in aid and/or natural resource revenues. Increasingly 
governments have additional resources from increases in natural resources revenues and aid (for 
greater detail see Leonard, 2003; Moore, 2007).  
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Global social movements in response to privatisation and globalisation of public services. There 
is a proliferation of new actors and institutions like transnational NGOs that are providing 
momentum to social movements (see for more discussion Leach and Scoones 2007).  
The reduction of civil space and freedoms in one-fifth of all countries. Freedom House 
(Puddington, 2008) noted a retreat of freedoms in 2007. However, that means the remaining 80% 
things may well be improving. It outlines four global trends. First, ‘...a resurgence of pragmatic, 
market-oriented, or energy-rich dictatorships. Most visibly in Russia and China, but also in other 
parts of the world ‘rights based governance’ is deemed to be an anachronism (ibid., p. 4). Global 
governance monitoring bodies such as the UN Human Rights Council and the Organisation for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe are being undermined by such trends. Secondly, an 
increasing ‘...decline in freedom of association. As repressive regimes move to strengthen their 
authority and eliminate sources of political opposition, they increasingly target human rights 
organizations, advocates of government transparency, women’s rights groups, representatives of 
minority groups, and trade unions,’ (ibid p4).  Countries in this category include a number of 
countries from the Middle East, Africa and the Baltic States.  Third, a weakening of non-electoral 
governance, Freedom House notes,  ‘nearly two-thirds of the world’s countries rank as electoral 
democracies, but many score poorly on government effectiveness and accountability,’ (ibid., p. 
5).  Corruption and lack of transparency are the causes of weak systems of governance in a 
number of countries in Africa, Latin America and Asia (ibid).  Finally, terrorism remains a 
critical problem, ‘while the world has been spared terrorist attacks of the magnitude of 9/11, the 
violent actions of Islamic radicals remain an important challenge to freedom, both in Muslim 
countries and in the wealthy democracies,’ (ibid p5).  Pakistan, Afghanistan, the Middle East 
seem to be in the grip of this phenomenon. Further, ‘...the threat of terrorism often provides an 
unjustified rationale for repressive emergency laws, torture, and the suppression of opposition 
political parties,’ (ibid p5). NGOs and CSO increasingly find themselves implicated in complex 
legal situation due to the emergence of these counter-terrorism measures (CTMs). The State is 
using its increased powers under CTMs to monitor civil society (see for more discussion Sen, 
2007). 
Increased decentralisation of service delivery. There has been a trend towards the transfer of 
public functions to lower tiers of the state in administrative, fiscal and political terms. The aim 
being to deliver better governance and public services. Over 75 countries have undertaken 
policies of decentralisation in the past 25 years (Ahmad, 2005), it is clear that more and more 
countries will opt for decentralised systems for service delivery. Decentralisation involves fiscal 
decentralisation, entailing the transfer of financial resources in the form of grants and tax-raising 
powers to sub-national units of government; administrative decentralisation (sometimes referred 
to as deconcentration, where the functions performed by central government are transferred to 
geographically distinct administrative units; political decentralisation where powers and 
responsibilities are devolved to elected local governments; this form of decentralisation is 
synonymous  with democratic decentralisation (Robinson, 2007: 10). The road to decentralisation 
is pretty rocky, but it can bring dividends. Decentralised government can play a useful role: 
locally based leaders and civil servants are more likely to be aware of local circumstances and 
issues than national actors. That said, experience with decentralised government has been mixed. 
If decentralised government is to be effective, some fairly demanding conditions have to be met. 
The decentralised body needs to be granted the political authority and funds20 commensurate with 
                                                  
20 Or the authority to raise funds locally. This, of course, has its dangers: Ellis (2001) observing local 
government in Malawi, Tanzania and Uganda, notes the danger that local governments can impose heavy 
and regressive — flat rates imposed on firms however large or small — taxes on local businesses.  
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its remit; its leaders should be accountable to the electorate; and it requires sufficient 
administrative capacity. Decentralisation, as Manor stresses, is not a one-off reconfiguration of 
government. Decentralised government, and local administrations in particular, need to develop 
their capacity and competence. Most reviews of Bolivia’s experience since 1993, when central 
funds were allocated directly to municipalities, report that while many of the local administrations 
struggled at the start, many have since learned lessons, and gained capacity, competence, and 
confidence. (Whitehead  and  Gray Molina 2004) 
How is the adaptive capacity of the rural poor strengthened or constrained with respect to their 
access to markets, livelihoods, natural resources, services and governance? 
In sum, the main changes in public services governance are as follows:  
? New institutions: Tension between greater calls for citizen voice in public services at a 
time when there are changes in democratic space and the NPM. 
 
? New actors and roles: the changing roles of states due to changes in state financing, the 
expansion of state decentralisation, the increased role of private actors in service delivery 
in modalities of PPP and via the emergence of new agencies under the New Public 
Management paradigm. 
 
The consequence of changes in public services governance suggests two things relevant to the 
RP. 
i. Conflict between greater claims for citizen voices and decentralisation whilst voice and 
freedoms are retreating in many countries.  
ii. More finance available for public services from natural resource revenues, aid and 
(contentiously) private sector.  
How will these changes likely affect the RP access challenges? The increase in resources 
available may lead to greater spending on public services although this is by no means 
guaranteed. NPM has the potential to deliver more efficient public services through improved 
public management techniques. Decentralisation may lead to better public services. However, 
throughout there are likely to be greater conflicts as citizen’s claim to voice may sit uneasily with 
the retreat of freedom in a number of countries. 
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SECTION IV: CONCLUSIONS 
4a. EPIC conclusions 
i. Market EPICS 
Two threads run through the implications of economic changes for the rural poor. One is that 
their rights need to be protected and respected when economic opportunities mean that the 
resources they control, including their own labour, become valuable. This requires action at 
several levels: national legislation to give legal backing to the rights of the poor; active state 
monitoring to prevent the powerful abusing those rights; and freedom of association to allow civil 
society to help monitor rights and to allow the poor themselves to organise to defend their rights 
and interests.  
The other is the importance of facilitating linkages within the rural economy and interactions with 
the urban economy. Economic opportunity is most likely to be taken up in the first instance by 
those not poor, so that the poor need to look to derived benefits through linkages. Easier 
interactions with urban areas should also open new opportunities for the rural poor, including the 
possibility of migrating out of the rural areas.  
Linkages and interactions can be improved through public investments in physical infrastructure, 
in the health, education and skills of the poor — and especially of their children, and by working 
to reduce market failures in rural markets and above in credit and financial systems.  
ii. People EPICs 
Policymakers should take heed of the demographic structure of each region. In this respect, in 
SSA countries the challenge is twofold: to manage both their demographic and economic 
transition. SSA countries are mired in a situation of high mortality, high fertility, and rapid 
population growth that could not be overcome without a tremendous increase of agricultural 
productivity (Conley and Al., 2007; Galor, 2005). It is in this context that development and 
poverty reduction strategies have to be developed. 
The classical structural transformation process and its employment pattern evolution are 
challenged. Could low income countries follow the classical model of structural transformation in 
the future to develop, just like European countries at the end of the 19th or the Asian dragons in 
the 60s-80s? Probably not because just as in the past development path has not been unique, the 
current features of local, national, regional and international contexts plead for a broadening of 
the development path possibilities. Rural households have developed specific strategies to cope 
with the difficulties they have faced based on income diversification to reduce risk exposure and 
vulnerability. This situation modifies the way poverty reduction strategies should be defined: it is 
not possible anymore to separate urban and rural poverty, rural and urban development. These 
challenges come together: any policy to reduce poverty should be embedded in a broader strategy 
of both rural and urban development. 
Such a situation leads to rethink the role of agriculture and rural development in the global 
development process, to take into account the challenges raised by this unaccomplished 
demographic transition both in term of population increase and of on-going labour force, and to 
design poverty alleviation policies as part of a global development strategy. 
iii. Natural EPICs 
Changes in the environment affect everyone, but can have a harder impact on the rural poor since 
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so many of their livelihoods depend directly and immediately on the productivity of natural 
resources, and since their resilience to changes may be lower on account of poverty.  
The challenges that environmental change produce for the rural poor consist in most cases of 
matters of:  
Governance and rights — ensuring that the poor are able to influence decisions that affect their 
lives, and that their rights to natural resources are respected;  
Finding ways to manage common property and the global commons in the interests of current and 
future generations; 
Building capacity to adapt to changes that will increase the resilience of the rural poor to current 
and future hazards. This in turn generates a challenging agenda that includes improved education, 
access to knowledge and information, and the defence and establishment of rights within a 
framework of democratic governance.  
iv. Techno EPICs 
Firstly, social, cultural and institutional dimensions are key to all technologies. Therefore to 
understand technological relevance in a community, one needs to understand the dynamics of the 
community first. This has implications for methodologies to introduce and evaluate a technology 
for the poor. The methods need to be participatory and inclusive.  
Secondly, a careful questioning of the framings of various debates and ‘sound science’ around 
technologies is required. For instance, when we discuss biotechnology we need to ask whether 
hunger is due to lack of production or result of distribution.  
Along with the debates, one needs to recognise players at all levels involved in the development 
and utilization of technology and their vested interests in diverting technological trajectories in 
certain directions. 
For technologies to be pro poor support from the government in terms of political will, enabling 
policies and regulatory frameworks are required. Policies and regulations need to incorporate 
developing countries at the international level and the rural poor and relevant communities’ at the 
national and local level. Generally international regulatory standards make certain assumptions 
about developing countries which hinder the latter to integrate themselves in the global markets. 
These regulations also need to include communication of risks to the communities concerned.  
4b. Governance across the EPICs 
A strongly recurring theme throughout is that of governance. Governance matters across the 
EPICs. We focused on aid governance, value-chain governance and public services governance. 
The consequence of changes in aid governance suggests two things relevant to the RP. First, more 
aid and more diverse aid. There will be large increases in aid from various sources and a greater 
diversity and new types of aid. Second, more voice for national governments internationally. 
Potentially more voice for the rural poor but this depends on national governance structures. 
The consequence of changes in value-chain governance suggests two things relevant to the RP. 
First, greater integration between local and global markets. Second, greater linkages between 
transnational and local CSOs on value-chains.  
The consequence of changes in public services governance suggests two things relevant to the 
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RP. First, conflict between greater claims for citizen voices and decentralisation whilst voice and 
freedoms are retreating in many countries. Second, more finance available for public services 
from natural resource revenues, aid and (contentiously) private sector.  
Across the EPICs it is difficult to analyse all the changes across all types of livelihoods, 
households and people. Two examples, climate change and food prices, demonstrate the level of 
complexity. 
In terms of climate changes, small-scale herders and agro-pastoralists result to be the most 
affected groups: as rainfall decreases, rangelands turned to desert and small-scale producers are 
often forced to sell livestock at a loss, increasing poverty at a time of drought. Small-scale 
producers often resort to selling their land and livestock and moving to cities in search of jobs, 
accompanied by increased pressure on urban centres and urban poverty. They are also directly 
affected as climate change (CC) has direct impacts on crop development. Water scarcity, or 
floods e.g. low rainfall resulting from CC, constitute difficulties for rain-fed crops to complete 
their growing cycle, accelerating land degradation and erosion, having a high impact on yields 
and hence on food insecurity and general poverty in rural areas accelerating men’s emigration. 
In terms of rising food prices: This has rapidly become a critical international concern. There are 
important differences in impacts of price rises among socioeconomic groups and typologies of 
farms and households within countries. Higher food prices can harm those poor households that 
are net food consumers because food accounts for a large share of their expenditures. In many 
countries, food can account for 70 to 80 % of the expenditures of the poorest quarter of the 
population, including farmers. In such circumstances, food price increases impact heavily on the 
purchasing power of the poor, particularly poorer consumers and net buyer smallholders. Poorer 
urban households - low wage earners and net buyers of food - are likely to be negatively affected 
by the higher costs of food. The transmission of price changes is expected to take effect earlier in 
urban areas, as most of them are close to ports or are well connected to international markets. In 
rural areas, a distinction needs to be made among households. For households which are net food 
buyers such as labourers and landless farmers, rising food prices will affect them negatively 
during the hungry season when food stocks are depleted and these households have to buy food in 
local markets to satisfy their family food needs. These net food buyers need safety nets to help 
them cope with rising high food prices during the hungry season. In contrast to small-scale farmer 
households that are net food sellers are faced with market opportunities to increase their incomes. 
However, they face many constraints and barriers to taking advantage of this situation. For these 
net sellers, policies (e.g. trade, agricultural services etc), infrastructure, and value chains need to 
be improved to them take advantage of rising food prices. 
4c. What do case studies of rural poor responses tell us about strengthening the adaptive 
capacity of the rural poor? 
One question we have referred to throughout the discussion of EPICs is how is the adaptive 
capacity of the rural poor strengthened or constrained with respect to their access to markets, 
livelihoods, natural resources, services and governance? 
We have collated a number of case studies in annex two here and in the RPR background paper to 
chapter 6 of rural poor responses to challenges raised by the EPICs.21 In discussing access to 
                                                  
21 Cases presented in the annex here focus on technology and governance in particular others relating to 
economics/markets and environment/natural resources are presented in the background paper to RPR 
chapter six and in a supplementary document to chapter six. On markets see RPR background paper to 
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governance in the background paper to chapter 6 (and supplementary paper to chapter 6) we 
found the case studies of rural poor responses identified a spiral of empowerment with four entry 
points. The four stages were, first, mobilization of the rural poor policy narrative, ideally via 
participatory techniques – what policies matter and what to argue for? Second, access to the 
policy processes - are the rural poor ‘in the room’? Third, engaging in and influence of the rural 
poor in policy processes – do the rural poor have the capacity to influence policy. Fourth, 
achieving change or the citizens monitoring and evaluation of policy change? This leading back 
to further mobilization. The nature of each of these is determined by dynamics of actor-specificity 
(interests, capacities), context-specificity (institutions, incentives and constraints) and competing 
narratives or world-views on rural development. We found in our case studies that participation in 
policy processes was mediated in particular by innovation in informal policy spaces, incentives to 
participate and inequality across caste, gender and income which shaped who participated and 
how. The prerequisites for enabling access to governance are reproduced in the table 5 of the 
background paper to chapter 6.  
Here, with regard to the adaptive capacities of the rural poor we can draw - in parallel to the 
above - an empowerment approach to adaptive change.  
In terms of the rural poor we identify, from case studies, enabling factors to strengthen adaptive 
capacity.  
We suggest four stages in a cycle of adaptation.  
First, there is the capacity of the rural poor to mobilise a response to the EPICs. This requires in-
depth understanding of the nature of the issues and possible responses and a capacity to form 
collective response.  
Second, there is a dialogue stage. This is the planning of putting into practice the adaptation 
responses of the rural poor. It involves the rural poor dialoguing with other stakeholders on 
adaptation responses of the rural poor and in particular it involves dialogue with local and 
national governments on adaptation options in order to enable such adaptation.  
However, dialogue with other stakeholders such as local and national governments is not enough. 
There is a third stage of shaping or influencing the dialogue towards the interests of the rural 
poor. This involves the ability of the rural poor to shape or influence the terms of their own 
adaptation. It is about implementing the adaptation choices of the rural poor.  
Fourth, there is achieving or actual adaptation and monitoring and evaluation of the achieved 
adaptation. This would then feed back into the first stage for new mobilisation. 
If we ask what pre-requisites are required to strengthen the adaptive capacity of the rural poor we 
can identify, across the above four stages a number of enabling factors. We draw these from the 
case studies presented in the annex here and in the RPR background paper to chapter 6. 
The series of enabling factors to stronger adaptive capacity of the rural poor includes:  
                                                                                                                                                    
chapter 6, template numbers 2, 3, 31, 32, 33, 49, 53 and on environment and natural resources see templates 
1, 5, 7, 8, 9, 19, 20, 23, 25, 28, 29, 33, 35, 37, 43, 45, 58, 46, 65, 67, 74, 75. 
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? Establishment and development of rural poor CSOs to articulate rural poor adaptation 
demands; 
? Awareness raising of rural poor CSOs on the EPICs; 
? Access of rural poor CSOs to information necessary to understand and advocate 
adaptive preferences; 
? Capacity development for rural poor CSOs to engage in debates on adaptation via 
technical, advocacy and language skills and skills in negotiation, lobbying, and 
communication; 
? Availability to rural poor CSOs of means of communication to make the voices of the 
rural poor heard, and to network with other stakeholders;  
? Capacity development for rural poor CSOs to engage in monitoring and evaluation of 
EPICs and adaptation options; 
? Receptivity to rural poor voice from governance structures, bureaucracy and 
politicians; 
? A defined and publicized procedure for providing feedback and support in the 
fulfillment of adaptation to rural poor CSOs and policy makers; 
? Effective local and regional co-ordinating mechanisms. 
Development of strong local institutions and producer organizations in particular is essential, with 
a voice to help shape strategy development and policy making processes as well as to ensure 
interventions are demand led meeting the needs of their members at the local level. Initiatives to 
support and strengthen these institutions and organisations are critical to the adaptive capacities 
of the rural poor.  
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ANNEX 1: EXAMPLES OF CROSS EPIC INTERACTIONS 
Demography and employment 
The past evolution of the population growth and the employment pattern have to be confronted to 
the factors that allowed such development, so as to identify what the binding constraints to any 
future development process are or could be. Table 6 below emphasizes the interdependences 
between demography to the others EPICS. While not trying to be exhaustive, the table 
emphasizes the interdependences between the different EPICS. 
Table 6. Population growth and labour force interactions with emerging issues. 
 Economics Environment Technology 
Population growth  • Role of international 
and regional trade to 
meet food excess 
demand and supply 
• Balance between 
food demand and 
supply 
• Price level and 
access to food (and 
corresponding 
income level) 
• Employment 
challenge 
• Poverty and 
inequality reduction 
• Increasing pressure 
on natural resources 
• Biodiversity loss 
 
Agriculture capacity 
to absorb labour 
supply 
• Markets structures 
and development: 
vertical and 
horizontal 
integration => 
inclusion / exclusion 
of farmers? 
• Regional markets 
and non tradable 
food vs. global 
markets and tradable 
agricultural 
productions 
• Overcome market 
failures and develop 
new markets 
• Increasing pressure 
on land and water 
=> reduction of the 
size of the farm + 
area available per 
agricultural worker 
• Loss of biodiversity, 
deforestation 
• Stringent issue in 
the context of 
climate change and 
desertification 
• Increase the 
productivity of land 
more rapidly than the 
productivity of 
labour 
• Expansion of 
technologies to 
enhance agricultural 
productivity 
Alternative jobs to 
agriculture 
• Mobility of labour: 
domestic and 
international 
migration 
• State of labour 
market (industry, 
• Pressure on the 
environment of 
other primary 
sectors 
• Competitiveness of 
industries and 
services 
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services) 
• Formal / informal 
labour markets 
• Rural / urban non 
farm employment 
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Technology and technological innovation 
Governance linkages include: The (profitable) production of biofuels depends on governance 
policies and regulations. Subsidies for biofuel production could be regressive for the poor if not 
designed appropriately. Biofuel production may drive up food prices and potentially lower energy 
cost. This would prove harmful to the poor, since a majority of their expenditure is on food 
consumption. On the other hand subsidizing biofuels would give incentives to grow and process 
biofuels (as the environmental benefits are externalities). The growing complexities between 
biofuels and food security would suggest the need for rural social protection policies for the food 
insecure. ICTs and e-governance have the potential to increase transparency, inclusiveness and 
knowledge sharing. A study in five states of India showed that ‘the cost of accessing service has 
been reduced of the three projects where significant corruption was reported in the manual 
system, one project was able to eliminate corruption. In the other two projects the impact was 
marginal’ (Bhatnagar 2007).  
Market linkages include: There is no doubt that biotechnology is a profitable business for global 
life science companies such as Sygenta and Monsanto. The TRIPS agreement and other IPR laws 
have provided security against information externalities (where enforced). One of the most 
pertinent debates in biotechnology is its cost effectiveness for poor small farmers under all natural 
and physical conditions.  
Biofuels trade which faces trade barriers via the WTO. Unless changed, these barriers will retard 
development of the bioenergy sector in countries with a comparative advantage (often developing 
countries with tropical climates) and encourage the development of protected and more costly 
bioenergy production in many rich countries.  
ICTs have a role in economic growth and market efficiency, but there is little conclusive evidence 
(McNarama, 2007: 3). Economic growth is severely constrained in environments where markets 
and institutions perform poorly because of weak information, communication and knowledge 
flows. ICTs can boost the productivity of individuals and firms, both by permitting greater 
outputs for a given input of scarce resources and by making available new information and 
knowledge about processes, products, techniques and markets. 
Demography linkages include: Biofuel production will impact land and labour markets in rural 
areas. There will be increased pressure on both these factors of production. This pressure may 
adversely affect food crop agriculture. However, but it may also create new jobs and incomes. 
ICTs have the potential to interact with migration trends in two ways via information flows both 
ways on employment and remittances.  
Environment linkages include: One of the most common debates in biotechnology and transgenic 
techniques such as GMOs is its impact on the environment. There remains a certain amount of 
uncertainty surrounding the issue because the long term assessments on environment cannot keep 
pace with the fast moving research and innovation in the field.  
Biofuels technologies have the potential to reduce greenhouse gases. However, the GHGs 
produced in the process of manufacturing biofuels may greatly undermine this reduction. Second 
generation biofuel technology may have be cleaner. The production of biofuels depends on the 
natural resource base of a region. One could adapt to unfavourable land through the second 
generation technologies. Biofuels technologies can also lead to conversion of shrubs, grass and 
other non-food plants into biofuel. These could very well grow on marginal land (this is so-called 
2nd generation). The really big danger of high GHG from biofuels is in land use change, both 
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direct and indirect (displacement). For example, if growing maize for ethanol results in soy being 
displaced, and to compensate land in the Cerrado is converted to soy fields, then say goodbye to 
any savings of GHG. 
 
ICTs can interact with the environment in three dimensions. First, environmental risks and 
changes: This dimension is more apparent against the threat of climate change. As mentioned 
above, periodic information systems like the radio, internet, even relatively traditional ones like 
loud speakers can efficiently act as warning mechanisms and as weather forecasts. Second, stable 
environmental characteristics:  These characteristics along with the former affect livelihood 
strategies and opportunities. For instance, the geothermal snapshots of regions can reveal a lot 
about potential natural resources and dangers which could impact livelihoods. This information 
can be disseminated to large audiences through another set of ICTs such as projection screens, 
internet etc. Third, although this is not often discussed the hardware of ICTs may create toxic 
waste if not disposed safely.  
Market Linkages Include: Changes in the systems of governance of the IMF through an 
expansion of the quota system may lead to more influence of developing countries over economic 
policy.  The increased presence of China in Africa may lead to an increase in trade and improved 
access to Chinese markets for the rural poor through better investment in infrastructure. 
Moreover, increasing regional cooperation carries the  potential for high economic cooperation 
between member states, better bargaining power for producers  within regional entities and 
expansion of markets. The globalisation of markets is leading to increased trade in natural 
resources which in turn is leading certain nations to ignore rights based governance and also 
become less responsive to the demands of its citizens. The strengthening of RPOs is intended to 
allow rural producers to engage with globally integrated markets better and increase their 
bargaining power in free market systems. The link of New Public Management and Public Private 
Partnerships with markets is that they are founded on the principle of market-based competition 
in provision of public services.   
Demographics and Social Characteristics Linkages Include: The dramatic rise in funding from 
new philanthropic foundations to the health sector may lead to a decreased disease burden.  
Emerging modalities of governing international supply chains may lead to improved working 
conditions and greater regional integration may lead to greater mobility of labour and possibly 
more job opportunities. Along with these potentially positive changes, the increased dependence 
of certain countries on aid and natural resources for revenue will lead to decreased quality of 
governance in rural areas which may impact of rural livelihoods and migration strategies. 
Environment Linkages Include: The emergence of China as a donor has potentially negative 
impacts on the environment as Chinese aid is outside the OECD guidelines. Expansion of 
decentralization might lead to populations having a greater say over their environment which in 
turn might lead to better environmental management. 
Technology Linkages Include: The emergence of new philanthropic foundations will lead to an 
increase in funding for innovation in health and agriculture technology. The links of emerging 
trends in governance with technology are also evident as the globalisation of social movements is 
being facilitated by the use of sophisticated information technology.  
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ANNEX 2: EXAMPLES OF RURAL POOR RESPONSES 
Technology and technological innovation 
Existing technologies 
? Democratising Biotechnology in India 
A citizens jury held in Andhra Pradesh was an example of an exercise in deliberative 
democracy. It was devised as a means of those affected by the government's Vision 2020 
for food and farming in Andra Pradesh to shape a vision of their own. DFID with other 
partners initiated a citizens’ jury of small and marginal farmers as jurors to 
comprehensively assess GM crops. After listening to various stakeholders, the jurors 
sought to build their own sustainable agriculture scenario (see background paper to 
chapter 6, template 11). 
? Water management technology in Peru 
Farmers in Peru suffer from a deterioration of natural resources and to curb this, the 
national government designed a national strategy. IFAD is helping implement a part of 
this strategy in the certain high Andean communities.  This project had three core 
features, a) Management of productive natural resources through a clear framework for 
the transfer of funds to communities.  b) Development  of private technical assistance and 
training services, which corresponded to increase supply by a cascade training of local 
professionals. c)  A community level competition-based selection of an innovative 
irrigation technique that increased irrigation efficiency by 30% (see background paper to 
chapter 6, template 46). 
? Community Led Total Sanitation (CLTS) in Bangladesh 
CLTS does not prescribe any technological models and encourages the communities to 
develop and innovate models that are most convenient to them. The Community Led 
Total Sanitation Approach was initiated by WaterAid in the rural parts of Bangladesh. 
The aim was to achieve 100% open Defecation Free status in the targeted villages 
without any external subsidies and participatory technological processes. Communities 
evolved more than 300 innovations to build latrines and toilets. Communities made these 
toilets more technologically sophisticated as time passed. The programme acted as an 
entry point for other locally empowered initiatives. The programme brought about 
sustainable change in hygiene behaviour. The technological innovations were very 
context specific would have to undergo some change to be adopted elsewhere (especially 
in heavy rain prone areas). 
 Source:  http: //www.livelihoods.org/hot_topics/docs/CLTS 
? Childhood vaccination in the Gambia, the Republic of Guinea, Nigeria and Sierra Leone 
IDS and other co-researchers, collaborating partners took a distinctive anthropological 
approach to explore how parents' own perspectives and experiences, embedded in broader 
cultural and political processes, shape immunisation demand, supply and interfaces with 
providers in. Research findings included most mothers have culturally-grounded demand 
for vaccination. Vaccination default or lateness reflects haphazard problems (e.g. family 
events, illness, travel) and intra-household relations. Rumours that vaccines cause 
sterility, violence and paralysis circulate, but have led to mass refusal only when top-
 74
down campaigns are privileged; technological practices intersect with cultural 
conceptions; providers' motivations are interpreted within political tensions, and 
influential individuals and media networks operate.  
Source:  http: //www.ids.ac.uk/index.cfm?objectId=9344AE87-A02E-10F4-
CA97611188ACF9FE 
? The WHO AFRO Pediatric Bacterial Meningitis (PBM) surveillance network 
The WHO AFRO Pediatric Bacterial Meningitis (PBM) surveillance network was 
launched in 2001 and focuses on laboratory confirmed meningitis in children younger 
than 5 years. The project included 26 countries. The primary goals of PBM are to provide 
a framework for providing advocacy for new vaccine introduction, demonstrating the 
burden of disease and contributing to the generation of information that is critical for the 
design and selection of new conjugate vaccines appropriate for African countries. The 
number of Hib cases began to decline after a lead period of 6 months following the 
introduction of the vaccine. Good surveillance data, cost-benefit and cost effectiveness 
analyses and strong advocacy are central to the continued efforts to control and 
significantly reduce the mortality and morbidity caused by diseases.  
 
Source:  Communicable Diseases Epidemiological Report. 2003. CDER WHO. Africa 
Regional Office. 
 
New(er) technologies 
? Pro-Poor Biofuels and the Participatory Tribal Development in India 
 
Powerguda in Adilabad district of Andhra Pradesh State, India is inhabited by poor tribal 
people. The Integrated Tribal Development Agency (ITDA), Adilabad District asked 
ICRISAT to assist by providing its integrated watershed management expertise. ITDA 
donated an oil extracting machine to the village. Seeds of Pongamia, Neem etc. can be 
crushed in this machine to extract biodiesel oil that is used locally or sold on the market. 
This oil mill has become an important source of income for the village. A parallel 
interesting benefit of planting Pongamia is that because this energy source is renewable, 
it qualifies to earn carbon credits to offset global warming. Also, the planting of 
Pongamia trees on wastelands helps to sequester atmospheric carbon into tree biomass. 
The World Bank recently bought carbon credits from the village and the villagers 
reinvested thins on a nursery and sell Pongamia and other biofuel compatible seeds to the 
Forest Department.  
 
Source:  Pro Poor Biofuels for Asia and Africa: ICRISAT’s Perspective. Working Paper 
2007. http: //www.icrisat.org/Investors/Biofuel.pdf 
? IFAD Information and Communication Centres in Senegal 
Information and communication centres aim to bridge the information gap and set up a 
platform for the exchange and sharing of knowledge and experience among the various 
actors involved in the local development process. The initiative has the overall aim of 
helping to improve rural inhabitants’ living conditions through development of local 
information and knowledge management capacities (generation, access, use), promotion 
and strengthening of local information systems, allowing information and knowledge to 
be shared within grass-roots communities and organizations and strengthening of the 
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implementation framework and conditions for local development processes (see 
background paper to chapter 6, template 79) 
? Rural Information Helpline, Bangladesh.  
In 2004, the Development Research Network (D.Net) in Bangladesh set up the Rural 
Information Helpline. Specialist helpdesk operators in the capital Dhaka have Internet 
access and a database of responses to common livelihoods-related queries. However 
many villagers were disconnected from the Helpline so the ‘Mobile Ladies’ initiative was 
introduced. For many, a mobile phone call is made directly to the Helpline with quick 
answers. A ‘no exclusion’ policy has helped create confidence among the villagers. The 
Helpline was accessed by more than 4,000 users over a 15 month period. Challenges of 
cost, sustainability, turning information into action, assisting the poorest people remain. 
Source:  Miller D. Mobile Phones and Development. Id21 insights no. 69.  
? ‘Sousveillance’ in Elections, Combodia, Ghana 
 In 2007, 500 NGO election monitors were sent out with mobile phones to polling stations 
in Sierra Leone. Their job was to send reports via SMS/text messages. Benefits included 
rapid awareness of irregularities and unofficial voting tallies that could be compared with 
official results. In the 2004 Ghanaian presidential elections, individual voters called radio 
phone-in shows by mobile to report intimidation or obstruction. This prompted a police 
response in a way that a direct call to the police might not have. This proves a reminder 
of the power of combining mobiles with other information and communication 
technologies. Similarly, combining mobile phone cameras with websites has proven 
effective in reporting electoral misdeeds in a number of countries.’ 
      Source:  Miller D. Mobile Phones and Development. Id21 insights no. 69.  
? Vulnerability Assessment and Enhancing Adaptive Capacity to Climate Change in Semi-
arid Areas in India.  
 The Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation along with established 
organisations in India started the programme. The overall goal of the Program is to secure 
the livelihoods of rural poor and vulnerable communities by promoting adaption 
measures. The coping capacity of rural communities in semi-arid areas shall be enhanced 
by awareness creation on climate change at village and district level, dissemination of 
best practices and participatory technology. 
 
 Source:  http: 
//webapps01.un.org/dsd/caseStudy/public/displayDetailsAction.do?code=411 
 
Technological Innovation 
? Nerica 
Keeping birds away is vital for rice farmers, as attacks or damage caused by birds to 
crops can cause them to lose their entire investment. However, this can take a large 
proportion of time and prevent farmers from doing other things, a situation that can lead 
to food insecurity in a highly agriculture-dependent household. Household heads often 
ask their wives and children to take over the task of scaring away birds while they 
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undertake other activities such as hunting, fishing etc. However, children’s involvement 
in bird-scaring can mean they miss schooling and women lose time from other important 
farming. In 2006, it was noted that the NERICA 4 variety sown alongside other varieties 
of rice was attacked less by birds. The study of the migratory patterns of birds improves 
the impacts of this innovation. In the Bumba zone of the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, for example, March-sown rice coincides with the arrival of flocks of birds. On the 
other hand, May-sown rice suffers very little from attacks by birds. Parallel with this 
innovation, during the growing phase, during testing, leaf and twig miner caterpillars 
were observed to be resistant to chemical treatment, since they are so well wrapped in the 
leaf that it prevents contact with the chemical product. The use of broken palm nut spread 
over the field as bait attracted sufficient numbers of ants, which attacked the caterpillars, 
even in their hiding places. With this trial, good results were obtained: the high cost of 
treatment was eliminated, and risks of human poisoning and environmental pollution 
avoided. 
? Soil and water conservation in Niger 
In the Tohoua region of Niger, regular floods used to bring fertile sediment to the valley 
floor but a succession of droughts led to loss of vegetation on the valley slopes. As a 
result, water runs off rapidly, causing gully erosion on the slopes and damage to fields 
downstream. In 1988, a ten-year programme of soil and water conservation was launched 
in Tahoua, Niger to reintroduce simple, replicable conservation practices. Thirteen local 
farmers made a study visit to Yatenga, in Burkina Faso, where they discovered the 
successful use of a land rehabilitation technique known in Yatenga as zai, that resembled 
their own traditional planting pits. The improvements consisted of increasing their 
dimensions from a diameter of 10 cm to 20-30 cm, from a depth of 5 cm to a depth of 10-
25 cm, to collect and store more rainfall and runoff, and putting organic matter in the pits 
to improve soil fertility. This organic matter attracts termites, which digest it and make 
the nutrients more easily available to the plant roots. They also dig channels and by doing 
so increase the water holding capacity of the soil. When farmers dig the pits, they remove 
the soil and bank it on the downstream side. This forms a small ridge which helps retain 
more water. When it rains, the holes fill with water and farmers plant millet or sorghum 
in them. When the Nigerian farmers returned home, some decided to revive the 
traditional hand-dug planting pit technique, known locally as tassa. They started with 4 
ha of land on which the technique was applied, including one field next to a main road so 
people passing by could see the impact. The results were so impressive that the following 
year tassa use increased to 70 ha. This was a drought year; only those farmers using tassa 
had a reasonable harvest. Over the next few years, tassa was instrumental in bringing 
4,000 ha back into production. In 2007-8, tassa has become an integral part of the local 
farming scene and is still spreading at a rate of about 2 to 3 ha per year. It has improved 
household food security and mitigated agricultural risk for many impoverished families 
in Niger. The technique is now being disseminated and taken up in Yatenga in Burkina 
Faso, and is being introduced in Cape Verde. 
? Micro-irrigation in Senegal 
With the aim of effectively reducing poverty in a structurally defective agricultural 
production zone, the PRODAM project financed by IFAD, working closely with local 
people, launched an intensive production system based on the use of micro-irrigation. 
Initiatives have focused on: (i) The installation of a drip-irrigation system to rationalize 
water use while improving productivity (increased yields, reduced plant health risks); (ii) 
Connecting market gardens (3 to 5 ha) to the boreholes of beneficiary villages in order to 
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reduce investment costs; (iii) Social and financial mobilization of emigrants and the rural 
community in support of the beneficiaries in financing part of the investment for the 
market gardens (about 25%); and (iv) Establishment of a technical and organizational 
support mechanism for farmers composed of the PRODAM and permanent technical 
services (water, agriculture etc.) in preparation for sustainability after the close of the 
programme. 
? Unfermented cassava (Manihot Esculenta Crantz) flour 
Cassava is a tropical species native to the Americas and it is grown in tropical zones with 
one or two rainy seasons with annual rainfall of 600 mm to more than 4,000 mm. The 
future of this crop in developing countries in general, Africa in particular, is based largely 
on a variety of products related to cassava, which include starch, miondo, tapioca and 
cassava flour. However, all these products are faced to varying degrees with the problem 
of conservation. This situation led us to take a closer look at such the demand and 
potential for marketing products such as unfermented cassava flour. In the medium and 
long term, cassava flour can provide additional income for rural people and thus help 
reduce poverty. The potential of unfermented cassava flour has not yet been fully tapped, 
however. Its strong points are good quality, odourless, pure white colour, a granularity 
similar to that of wheat, perfect uniformity, good moisture content, capacity to replace 
wheat flour in about 90 % of its uses, particularly in breads, cakes and pastries, and good 
conservation for about six months in the right conditions. However, production of this 
flour suffers from a number of constraints, including those linked to its cutting up, 
drying, grinding and conservation. These constraints have now been addressed through 
the development and dissemination of appropriate farming and processing that can be 
used in both urban and rural contexts. With the support of appropriate policy frameworks, 
small-scale farmers that grow cassava roots should be able to obtain higher incomes and 
improved livelihoods through the processing and more secure markets for cassava flour, 
thus enabling them to improve their living conditions. 
Further information on all above mentioned case studies are available on FIDAfrique website at 
www.fidafrique.net/article1619.html 
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Governance 
Aid 
? The IFAD support program to the PRSP process in West and Central Africa 
This IFAD project aims to assist in evaluating ‘the effectiveness of different institutional 
arrangements and mechanisms for successfully involving the rural poor in the design, 
implementation, and monitoring of the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) process. This is 
done through the development of low costs instruments, tools and guidelines for 
monitoring and evaluating PRS processes, outcomes and impacts of proposed PRS 
options on rural poverty to make PRS a viable framework for poverty reduction (see 
background paper to chapter 6, template 36). 
? The Government of Cameroon’s participatory approach to PRS  
The government of Cameroon adopted a participatory approach to poverty reduction 
under the HIPC (heavily indebted poor countries) initiative. Public consultations on 
poverty reduction were initiated with a province-based programme in 2000, and in 2002, 
each of which were followed by a national seminar to discuss the findings of the public 
consultations. ‘At one level, public involvement has been quite broad. Important sectoral 
linkages have been made, interesting initiatives funded. However, these owe much more 
to donor influence of an essentially conditional nature than to national participation.’ (see 
background paper to chapter 6, template 76). 
? IFAD support to the NEPAD Agriculture Programme: Africans Speak Out   
NEPAD’s agriculture programme is an expression of the will of African heads of State to 
lay the groundwork for African development geared towards making the best possible use 
of the continent's own resources and skills. One of the main failings of NEPAD and state 
policies is the lack of broad based participation and this project, supported by IFAD, 
helped incorporate of the voice of the rural poor in policy processes.  There were various 
findings from this project one was that ‘...priorities among the policy and strategy 
objectives pursued by the farmers' and producers' organizations for agricultural and rural 
development relate to promoting family farming through rural and economic 
development policy, seeking food sovereignty, preserving the farming identity, and 
defending the agricultural profession against the threat of globalization (see background 
paper to chapter 6, template 33). 
? Aid and Accountability in Honduras and Mozambique 
UNDP has set up ‘poverty observatories’ in different districts of Honduras to consult 
with the population about what they think have been the results of donors projects in their 
area. UNDP also supported a poverty observatory that the Government of Mozambique 
set up in 2003 to monitor and evaluate the implementation of the PRSP. It brings together 
the government, donors and CSOs. The twenty CSOs involved from the outset grouped 
themselves in a network called the G20; this group has subsequently grown substantially. 
Through this observatory, the G20 has been involved in government working groups, in 
donor mid-year and joint reviews and carried out an independent evaluation of poverty 
reduction policies.’ 
Source:  EURODAD (2008). 
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? IFAD and governance of water bodies in Bangladesh 
An IFAD funded project aimed at improving the governance of inland water bodies in 
Bangladesh has benefited landless fishers. Contesting the dominance of the wealthy on 
annual leasing arrangement of lakes and shores, ‘...long-term lease arrangements for 
public lakes and shores have been introduced and fisher groups now have a more active 
role in resource management.’ This demonstrates how ‘reforms in leasing practices, 
combined with the legal establishment of fisher organizations and the empowerment of 
these groups to sustainably manage their resources, can lead to broad benefits for both 
poor communities and the government.’ (see background paper to chapter 6, template 23 
? IFAD’s Farmer Forum 
‘There are promising cases where the organisations of poor rural women and men are 
becoming stakeholders exerting influence on policy processes. At the national level, for 
example, the formulation of National Agriculture Laws (Loi d’Orientation Agricole) in 
Senegal and Mali was deeply influenced by consultations with, and inputs from, national 
FO apex organisations. At regional level, processes of dialogue on family agriculture 
between governments and organisations of poor rural people are occurring. This is, for  
example, the case of the REAF process (Specialized Meeting on Family Agricultura - 
Reunión Especializada sobre la Agricultura Familiar) in Latin America Southern Cone 
Common Market (MERCOSUR).’  
IFAD Farmer’s Forum at- http: //www.ifad.org/farmer/2008/roundtable/e/policy.htm 
Governance: Value-chains and the private sector 
? Coordination Framework for Rural Producer Organisations 
A Coordination Framework for Rural Producer Organisations (CCOF) (consisting of 3 
million male and female farmers of all status) was asked by the Government of Burkina 
Faso to study the Agrarian Land Reform Act and make recommendation for its 
improvement. Some of these recommendations included suggestions such as small and 
large producers should both have equal access to land and investment facilities, paper 
work for legalising land ownership needs to be simplified and certain securities again 
eviction should be provided (see background paper for chapter 6, template 65). 
? CAADP 
CAADP is concerned with improving trade capacity and market access. Examples of 
activities under this include the funding of regional trade facilitation programs in the 
COMESA and ECOWAS regions to promote the integration of regional markets and 
raise the competitiveness of local products in these markets.  
? EPAs and the Network of Peasant Organisations of Agricultural producers in West Africa 
(ROPPA) 
This IFAD grant given to the West African Network of Farmers’ Organizations and 
Agricultural Producers aims ‘to promote the participation and effective contribution of 
Africa’s farmer organisations in the process of negotiating trade and Economic 
Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between EU and ACP countries. The overall objective is 
to enable farmers in ACP countries to share their views and perceptions on EPAs with 
negotiators from ACP countries and other civil society stakeholders (see background 
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paper to chapter 6, template 40). 
? Labour standards in South Africa and Costa Rica 
In South Africa since 1994 employment legislation has mandated unemployment 
insurance, conditions, labour relations and the right to combine, security of tenure and 
employment equity. The problem is achieving those standards in rural areas. Even in 
South Africa, amongst internationally competitive apple farms in the Cape, the 
introduction of standards since 1994 has been of ever less benefit to the work force since 
there has been a steady process of casualisation of labour. The permanent work force has 
shrunk, and contracting in gangs for specific tasks has increased. Contract labour is 
apparently not covered by the legislation and such workers do not enjoy unemployment, 
security or other benefits. This development apparently also applies to the private 
standards that concern some buyers in global chains, such as the Ethical Trading 
Initiative Baseline Code. Once the staff are contracted in, as opposed to being formally 
employed, the standards apparently no longer apply. In contrast, there have been more 
positive experiences with a large multinational banana company that operated farms in 
Costa Rica (Smith 2006). The Ethical Trading Initiative Code had been introduced in the 
context of poor labour relations historically, although it was one of several overlapping 
initiatives that affected the company22 ⎯ including a 2001 signing of an International 
Framework Agreement (IFA) with the International Union of Foodworkers (IUF) and 
COLSIBA (Latin American Coordination of Banana Workers Unions).23 Some good had 
come from this, especially in health  and  safety ⎯ more use of protective equipment, 
adherence to norms, and reported less sickness; and in fewer cases of harsh treatment of 
workers by supervisors. Women workers felt less likely to be harassed, but although open 
discrimination was absent, female workers tended to be confined to particular jobs. Hours 
                                                  
22 ‘The Company was working with a number of voluntary code initiatives to manage and monitor its social 
(and environmental) performance.  
• Since 1992 with Rainforest Alliance’s Better Banana Project (BBP). This largely focuses on the 
environmental impacts of banana production but includes some assessment of working conditions 
and community relations. All of the Company’s owned farms were certified BBP. 79% of their 
Costa Rican supplier s were also certified BPP.  
• Since 2000 with Social Accountability International’s SA8000 standard, which is almost 
identical to the ETI Base Code. All owned farms in Costa Rica were certified. The largest supplier 
and a couple of others were working towards certification.  
• Since 2003 with Eurepgap, which includes a section on worker health and safety. All owned 
farms in Costa Rica were certified.  
• Since 1996 with ISO14001, but only in Costa Rica.  
‘In 2000 the company consolidated its policies into a Code of Conduct based on core values of integrity, 
respect, opportunity and responsibility. It embarked on a programme of internal and external monitoring 
and public reporting, as well as communication and capacity building throughout the company and its value 
chains. A governance structure was created headed by the Corporate Responsibility Office who reports to 
an Audit Committee comprised of Board members. Responsibility for implementation lay with the Senior 
Management Team supported by a Corporate Responsibility Steering Committee, with further delegation of 
responsibility to officer s in each division. The Code was the foundation of the company’s management 
approach and implementation of the ETI Base Code could not be distinguished from it. Furthermore BBP, 
which pre-dates the Code, includes elements of the ETI Base Code.’ (Smith 2006) 
23 The same agreement is reported in ILO 2003 and Hurst et al. 2005.  
 81
had been reduced, but 60 hour weeks were common ⎯ in part encouraged by low pay.  
Less progress had been made on allowing association, since while workers reported that 
they could join a union, some feared the consequences ⎯ apparently a fear transmitted 
by supervisors. Following the Code, the company had ceased to hire 16 and 17 year olds. 
But this was seen by workers and management as negative since adolescents no longer at 
school have nothing to do. There are some high profile cases where multinationals 
employ local staff on plantations and estates where campaigns have been mounted to 
shame the company into improving labour conditions. In these cases the campaigns have 
been led by international NGOs based in the North where the company has a high public 
profile. Examples include the Firestone rubber plantations in Liberia and tea estates in Sri 
Lanka owned by Lipton and Brooke Bond. More generic campaigns, since they target a 
set of employers rather than a single large company, have been launched on the use of 
pesticides on export flowers. In addition there are the struggles mounted by unions, such 
as those affiliated to the International Union of Food Workers, for better wages, 
conditions and decent treatment of workers. 
? RPOs in West Africa 
 
The Sahel and West Africa Club Secretariat (SWAC) of the OECD supports efforts of the 
Network of Peasant Organisations of Agricultural producers in West Africa (ROPPA) to 
strengthen its capacities for analysing and developing farm policies in West Africa. The 
SWAC secretariat commissioned an agricultural economist specialised in agricultural 
policy analysis to complement the independent deliberations of ROPPA members on this 
issue (see background to chapter 6 paper, template 63) 
 
? Value Chains Governance in Nicaragua 
 
The Government of Nicaragua was left with little effective control over the condition of 
workers in garment factories as they were a part of globally integrated supply chains.  
Three emergent forms of global governance were seen to affect change in this case.  The 
first were transnational networks of labour campaigners,  the second was a factory based 
international solidarity campaign and the third was the emergence of ‘supply-chain codes 
of conduct.  There is a multiplicity of such codes and including, corporate codes, industry 
association codes, multi-stakeholder codes and NGO-driven codes. 
 
Source:  Macdonald (2004). 
? RPOs in Viet Nam 
 
‘Since 2003, three Clam Clubs have been established in the coastal district of Tra Vinh 
province in southern Viet Nam.’  These were set up with the help of Oxfam collaborating 
with the local authorities, using monetary contributions by community members to 
purchase baby clams.  ‘There is strong demand for the clams and a lot of competition 
between the buyers, so the clubs are able to negotiate a good price. For this reason, the 
clubs do not make any agreements with the buyers before the harvest. The first harvest of 
clams in 2005 was a success and the clubs were able to sell the clams at a considerable 
profit. The profits were distributed to each member according to how much money they 
had invested at the start.’ 
 
Source:  Buckley (2007) 
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? RPOs in El Salvador 
‘Agrolempa was established in San Vicente in El Salvador in 2001, as a rural association 
with a commercial trading company that is 100 per cent owned by the association’  The 
start up capital for this company was provided by a local NGO and an Oxfam project, 
funded by the European Union. ‘The aim of the association is to improve the livelihoods 
of small-scale producers by helping them to obtain better prices for their agricultural 
produce. It tries to achieve this by helping its members to improve the quality of their 
fruit and vegetables and by buying their produce and selling it directly to the hospital 
industry, supermarkets, caterers, processors, and wholesale markets. In this way it cuts 
out the traders who pay low prices to the producers... Agrolempa has become one of only 
three agricultural trading companies supplying the major institutional markets and the 
retail and catering trade in  El Salvador. It has achieved this by focusing heavily on 
improving the quality of its members’ fruit and vegetable production and by developing a 
quality management system.’ 
Source:  Buckley (2007). 
Governance: Public service delivery 
? Health and Education Councils in AP, India 
Village Education Committees (ECs) and Mothers' Committees (MCs) (‘user 
committees’) which promoted parents' participation in the management and monitoring 
of local schools and maternal/child health services were established (see background 
paper to chapter 6 template 15). 
? Health Councils in Brazil 
The setting up of the Local Health councils, over two years, involved the mobilisation of 
over 2500 people to participate in at least one monthly meeting. The councils consist of 
24 effective and 24 substitute councillors, half of whom represent civil society, and the 
other half the govt, service providers, and health workers (see background paper to 
chapter 6 template 21).  
? Water Privatisation in Bolivia 
Protests broke out soon after the water supplies to Cochabamba and La Paz were 
privatised. Popular protest has led to both contracts being rescinded (see for further 
details on water protests WDM, 2006). 
? Vigilance Committees-Bolivia 
‘Vigilance committees are set up parallel to local elected bodies in Bolivia with a 
mandate to monitor these bodies.  They are composed of six elected leaders of traditional 
local governance systems, such as peasant syndicates and neighbourhood councils.  The 
VC’s main responsibility is to ensure that community priorities are reflected in municipal 
investment decisions.  But it is also empowered to wield  a legal instrument called a 
denuncia against local councils.  The VC can call for regular audits of local government, 
and if it detects corruption, it can lodge a complaint with the national executive branch, 
which passes it on to a special committee of the senate, which can in turn suspend central 
funds to the erring council until the case is resolved.’ 
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Source:   Goetz and Gaventa (2001). 
? Participatory Local Governance in the Philippines 
‘The local Government Code of 1991 establishes a Local  Development Council (LDC), 
for every province, city, municipality, and barangay.  The primary responsibility of the 
LDC is to draft comprehensive multi-sector development plans, including a 
comprehensive land-use plan for each local government unit concerned.  At least one-
fourth of the total membership of the LDCs should come from the NGO –Pos  (people’s 
organisation)  and private sectors.  LDCs have become vehicles for these civil society 
organisations to mobilise people in the barangay to claim from the government minimum 
services and to prioritise projects to be supported from local projects.’   
Source:   Goetz and Gaventa (2001). 
 
 
 
